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IN THE 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 6300. 
JESS ANDERSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH. 
HONORABLE M. J. BRONSON, JUDGE. 
ABSTRACT OF RECORD. 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
Tr.p. 
COMPLAINT. 
20 On this 1st day of March, A. D., 1940, before 
me, B. P. Leverich, City Judge and Ex-Officio Jus-
tice of the Peace of the City Court within and for 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, per-
sonally appeared L. W. Peirce who, on being, sworn 
by me, on his oath, did say that Jess Anderson, on 
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the 25th day of February, A. D., 1940, at the County 
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, did commit the crime 
of INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, as follows, 
to-wit: 
Jess Anderson killed Clark Romney with-
out malice; 
contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the State 
aforesaid, in such cases made and provided, and 
against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah. 
(Signed) L. W. Peirce. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, the day and 
year first above written. 
(Signed) B. P. LEVERICH, 
Filed March l, 1940. 
City Judge and Ex-Officio 
Justice .of the Peace. 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
INFORMATION. 
21 The Defendant, Jess Anderson, having been 
heretofore duly committed to this Court by B. P. 
Leverich, a committing magistrate of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, to answer to this charge, is 
accused by CALVIN W. RAWLINGS, District At-
torney of the Third Judicial District, State of Utah, 
by this Information, of the crime of INVOL UN-
TARY MANSLAUGHTER, committed as follows, 
to-wit: 
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That on the 25th day of February, A. D. 
1940, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Defendant, Jess Anderson, did unlawfully and 
without malice kill Clark Romney; 
contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the State 
of Utah, in such case made and provided, and against 
the peace and dignity of the State of Utah. 
(Signed) CALVIN W. RAWLINGS, 
District Attorney of the Third Judicial District, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Filed April 12, 1940. 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
MOTION TO QUASH. 
23 Comes now the defendant above named and 
moves to quash the information filed in the above en-
titled matter upon the following grounds and for the 
following reasons : 
1. That said information does not charge the 
defendant with the commission of an offense. 
2. That the information was filed without the 
defendant first having had or waived a preliminary 
examination. 
3. That there is more than one offense charged 
in said information, not provided for by Section 
105-21-31 of the Code. 
4. That the Prosecuting Attorney did not have 
authority to file the information. 
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Said Motion is based upon the files and records 
in the above entitled cause. 
(Signed) EDWARD F. RICHARDS, 
Attorney for Defendant. 
Filed April 19, 1940. 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS. 
24 Comes now the defendant above named and 
without waiving any of his rights under the Motion 
to Quash filed herein, moves the above entitled Court 
to order the District Attorney to file a Bill of Par-
ticulars in the above-entitled matter, setting forth 
the facts and circumstances as to how or in what 
manner said defendant did on the 25th day of Feb-
ruary, 1940, commit the crime attempted to be al-
leged in the information. 
Filed April 19, 1940. 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS, 
Attorney for Defendant. 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
MINUTE ORDER. 
25 On April 19, 1940, the court made and entered 
its minute order denying defendant's motion to 
quash and requiring the district attorney to file a bill 
of particulars by April 23, 1940. 
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(Title of Court and Cause.) 
BILL OF PARTICULARS. 
26-27 Comes now the State of Utah and in accordance 
with Section 105-21-9, Laws of Utah, 1935, and in 
pursuance to the order of the above-entitled Court, 
furnishes the following Bill of Particulars in the 
above-entitled case, to-wit: 
TIME : That said offense occurred be-
tween the hours of 6:45 and 7:30 o'clock A.M., 
on the 25th day of February, A. D. 1940. 
PLACE : That at said time the Defendant 
was driving an automobile in a Northerly direc-
tion on a public highway, to-wit, on Third East 
Street near to and approaching Twenty-first 
South Street, within Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, and that the said accident occurred as De-
fendant was driving said automobile in the in-
tersection of said Third East Street and Twen-
ty-first South Street, and that at said time and 
place, one Clark Romney was then and there 
driving an automobile in a Westerly direction on 
Twenty-first South Street, across the intersec-
tion of the Third East Street. 
MEANS : That at said time and place the 
said Defendant was operating said automobile 
carelessly and heedlessly and with a wilful and 
wanton disregard for the rights and safety of 
others, and without due caution and circum-
spection and at such a speed and in such a man-
ner as to endanger the life of one Clark Rom-
ney who was then and there driving an automo-
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bile West on Twenty-first South Street. Said 
Twenty-first South Street being an arterial 
highway with stop signs placed at the intersec-
tions of all streets entering the said Twenty-
first South Street; and that at the said time and 
place, the said Jess Andersen was driving said 
automobile at a speed in excess of Forty ( 40) 
miles per hour, which speed was dangerous and 
excessive, and that the said Jess Andersen did 
not stop at the stop sign facing South on Third 
East Street in a position visible to drivers enter-
ing Twenty-first South Street on said Third 
East Street; and that the s~id Jess Andersen 
drove said automobile into Twenty-first South 
Street without stopping, and at a speed in ex-
cess of Forty ( 40) miles per hour into and 
against the side of the automobile then and there 
being driven in a proper manner, in a Westerly 
direction by Clark Romney on said Twenty-first 
South Street. 
RESULT: That as a result of said colli-
sion between said automobile driven by the said 
Jess Andersen and the said automobile being 
then and there driven by Clark Romney, the said 
Clark Romney received injuries from which he 
died within the County of Salt Lake, on the 25th 
day of February, A. D. 1940. 
CALVIN W. RAWLINGS, 
District Attorney of the Third Judicial District, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
By (Signed) BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS, 
Assistant District Attorney. 
Filed April 27, 1940. 
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(Title of Court and Cause.) 
DEMAND FOR FURTHER BILL OF 
PARTICULARS. 
28 Comes now the defendant above named and re-
quests the above entitled Court to make an order di-
recting the District Attorney to file a further bill of 
particulars and set out therein the following: 
(a) How or in what manner Defendant was 
operating said automobile carelessly and heedlessly 
and with a wilful and wanton disregard for the 
rights and safety of others and without due caution 
and circumspection and in such a manner as to en-
danger the life of one Clark Romney; 
(b) Where and in what position the stop sign 
was located so as to be visible to drivers entering 
21st South Street, and how and in what manner and 
at what speed the automobile driven by Clark Rom-
ney was operated. 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS, 
Attorney for Defendant. 
Before the court entered the order concerning 
the demand for further bill of particulars, the fol-
lowing transpired : 
The Court: State vs. Jess Anderson. 
r. r, r. Mr. Roberts: In that case, your Honor, the 
~ ~ ~ State will not prove any acts except as stated ; that 
~ ~ ~ is, excessive speed and .going through a stop sign. 
r. r. r. 
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Mr. Richards: What about the allegation that 
Romney's car was being driven in a proper man-
ner? 
Mr. Roberts: That is surplusage. It does not 
matter how it was driven. 
(Discussion.) 
The Court: I am inclined to the view that the 
Court would preclude the State from proving any 
facts that they have not specifically alleged in their 
Bill of Particulars. I don't see how the Court could 
allow you to go into that, Mr. Roberts. 
Mr. Roberts: I don't, either. 
The Court: You have filed your Information in 
which you have alleged certain facts. Now, the mere 
fact that you say that he was careless and heedless 
and wilful and wanton, and all those things, that 
does not mean anything, does it, when you come to 
the proof? 
Mr. Richards: That is true, except that on a 
general complaint, for instance, if we were ever in a 
negligence case, and he alleged those, and I had not 
come in here and had not made him get down to more 
specific allegations, he could prove anything under 
the sun. 
The Court: In view of the limitations which 
the District Attorney has placed on the State, and 
the statement of the District Attorney that he con-
siders himself precluded from proving any facts 
other than the facts which he has alleged, and as set 
out in his Bill of Particulars, I think that there is no 
reason why I should not deny the demand for a fur-
ther Bill of Particulars. 
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Mr. Roberts: Of course, we will ask that the 
proposition of recklessness be put to the Jury; but 
the reckless driving will only prove the two acts. 
The Court : The motion for a further Bill of 
Particulars is denied. 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
MINUTE ORDER. 
29 On April 27, 1940, the court made and entered 
a minute order denying defendant's request for fur-
ther bill of particulars. 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
MOTION. 
30 Comes now the defendant above named and 
moves the above entitled court to require the plain-
tiff to elect whether said defendant is to be tried for 
the commission of the crime of involuntary man-
slaughter by having committed an unlawful act not 
amounting to a felony, or in the commission of a 
lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful 
manner, or having committed a lawful act which 
might produce death without due caution and cir-
cumspection. 
Dated this 21st day of May, 1940. 
Filed May 21, 1940. 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS, 
Attorney for Defendant. 
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(Title of Court and Cause.) 
MINUTE ORDER. 
32 On May 21, 1940, the court made and entered 
its minute order denying defendant's motion requir-
ing the state to elect whether defendant would be 
tried for the commission of the crime of involuntary 
manslaughter by having committed an unlawful act 
which might produce death in an unlawful manner, 
or having committed a lawful act which might pro-
duce death without due caution and circumspection. 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. 
62 BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above entitled 
matter came on regular for trial on the 21st day of 
May, 1940, at the hour of ten o'clock before the 
Honorable M. J. Brosnon, one of the Judges of the 
above-named Court, sitting with a jury, the defend-
ant being personally present, and the State of Utah 
being represented by Calvin W. Rawlings and the de-
fendant being represented by Edward F. Richards. 
Whereupon, DR. KENNETH B. CASTLETON 
was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff and 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
Direct Examination by IJfr. Rawlings. 
68 My name is Kenneth B. Castleton and I reside in 
Salt Lake City. I am a physician and surgeon, li-
censed to practice in Salt Lake City, State of Utah. 
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Qualifications of Doctor admitted. I knew Clark 
Romney during his life and saw him on the 25th of 
February of this year at the St. Marks Hospital. 
When I arrived there he was alive. He died at ap-
proximately 2:30 that afternoon at the hospital. I 
was present at his death. I made an examination of 
him at the hospital and found he had a basal skull 
69 fracture, multiple fractures of the ribs, punctures of 
the lungs, and fracture of his left humerus. These 
injuries were caused by an external force which 
might have occurred in a serious automobile acci-
dent. In my opinion, his death was caused by such 
injuries. 
70 Whereupon, ALEX ENGSTRUM was called as 
a witness on behalf of plaintiff and after being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
Direct Examination by Mr. Rawlings. 
My name is Alex Engstrum. I reside at Draper. 
I am a garage man and my garage is located at 7th 
East and Draper Road. I have been in this business 
for six years. I have owned an automobile and oper-
ated one since 1906. On the 25th of February of this 
year I was in the vicinity of 21st South and 3rd East 
71 in the automobile of Kenneth Silcox, of Riverton, at 
about 7 A. M. in the morning. I was sitting on the 
right side of the front seat and we were proceeding 
east approaching the intersection of 3rd East and 
21st South, when I saw a car coming from the south 
on 3rd East and going through the intersection, 
striking another car approaching from the east. The 
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car from the south was a Ford V -8. I observed the 
72 stop sign at the intersection at 21st South and 3rd 
East which the Ford V -8 did not stop at before 
entering the intersection. I have observed cars trav-
eling and have a fair idea of the speed of such cars. 
In my judgment the Ford V-8 when it entered the 
intersection was going between 40 and 45 miles per 
hour. The other car was an Oldsmobile and was 
73 traveling west. The impact took place at about the 
middle of the intersection. The Oldsmobile was on 
the north side of 21st South. I observed the im-
pact. I saw the Ford V -8 coming through the inter-
section. I hollered to Mr. Silcox, "Stop, they're go-
ing to hit!" We stopped immediately, and before he 
got stopped we saw this V -8 hit the Oldsmobile. I 
would say the V -8 struck the Oldsmobile in about the 
center. And then the Oldsmobile seemed to rise up 
in the air about 5 or 6 feet with the front end, then it 
turned completely over twice. It came to rest on the 
7 4 curbing between the sidewalk and the street on its 
wheels. The motor was still running. Mr. Silcox and 
I jumped out of the car and ran over there. I saw 
Mr. Romney lying in the gutter. My wife and 
daughter also came over and we picked up his over-
clothes that were in the car and put them under his 
head to make him comfortable, but we could not 
move him. The V-8 appeared to have the front end 
smashed in very badly. After the impact it turned 
completely around headed in a different direction 
from which it came. It was headed south. We re-
mained about thirty minutes and while we were 
there the officers came. I didn't see Officer Pierce, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-13-
but I saw another officer there. I don't know his 
name. The cars were not moved before the officers 
arrived. We left before Mr. Romney was removed. 
The picture marked Exhibit "A" looks something 
75 like the Oldsmobile. To the best of my knowledge 
it is the picture of the car that we saw. The picture 
marked Exhibit "B" appears to be the Ford V -8. 
The Oldsmobile was coming toward us and I have no 
judgment as to its speed. 
Cross Examination by Mr. Richards. 
76 The Ford stopped in the center of the road, it 
was turned around. It was in the center of the in-
tersection, but a little on the north side, about 10 feet 
north of the center line on 21st South, and west of 
the center line on 3rd East. I would estimate that it 
traveled about 5 feet from the point of impact. I 
observed the Ford first as I always look on intersec-
tions when I travel in a car. When I saw the Ford 
first the car in which I was traveling was between 4 
77 or 5 hundred feet away from the intersection. X-1 
on the board is where the car I was in was located 
when I first saw the Ford, at 4 or 5 hundred feet 
a way would make the mark come below the bottom 
of the board. But the distance between where the 
arrow of 33113, coming down to the west line where 
our car was located would be about 4 or 5 hundred 
78 feet straight out in the street. X-2 is the point where 
I first saw the Ford. I would say that would be 
about 10 feet or 15 feet behind the stop sign which 
is marked by a dot or circle. I never saw the stop 
sign until the crash. Then I began to look around. 
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I am not certain whether the Ford was behind or in 
front of the sign when I first saw it. But in my 
judgment it would be where the stop sign is located. 
It hadn't yet passed the stop sign. When I first saw 
the Ford I would say that it was about 39 feet south 
79 of the south curb line of 21st South. I saw the Olds-
mobile first when it was about 2 hundred feet from 
the intersection. X-3 is where I first saw the Olds-
mobile. It should be about 2 hundred feet from the 
east line of 3rd East. I followed the Ford from the 
time I first saw it until the time of the impact. It 
just took a few seconds, and during that time I made 
an estimate of the speed of the Ford. I did, after the 
impact, figure the speed just for my own good, to see 
what could happen in case somebody would come 
that way at me, and to see whether I should step on 
her and try to get by, or to stop. In fact, I studied 
that quite a bit. I have met up with a lot of them 
that same way. I also accidentally run stop signs 
81 myself, and didn't know they were there. I saw the 
Ford, then the Oldsmobile, and then almost instan-
taneously there was an impact. The first car I saw 
was the Ford. The next car was the Oldsmobile, and 
almost instantaneously after seeing both cars the im-
pact occurred. When I saw the Ford I was about 4 
to 5 hundred feet away. We started to stop im-
mediately. Just after the impact we were about 15 
82 feet from the west curb line on 3rd East street. We 
came to a stop there, and that is where I saw the stop 
sign. There was no other traffic that I noticed 
either north or south of 3rd East or on 21st South 
before or immediately after the impact. I had not 
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seen much traffic since I passed the hospital. The 
83 crash happened about 7 :00 A. M. We were travel-
ing about 30 miles an hour. I was not acquainted 
with Mr. Romney prior to the accident, and did not 
know him. When I stated I saw Mr. Romney, I 
meant that I had seen the gentleman that had been 
thrown out of his car. The Oldsmobile went up in 
the air 5 or 6 feet. It swerved over in the air two 
times and lit on the pavement between the pavement 
and the sidewalk. The two front wheels went off the 
ground. I do not know whether the wheels were 5 
or 6 feet, but the body of the car went that high, to 
me. It seemed to roll over right in the air, hit again, 
and rolled over once more, and then came to rest on 
its wheels. I don't remember whether it struck on 
the front or side. I did not see what distance it went 
87 after it came down on its wheels. I was too excited. 
I only saw one officer. I did not see Officer Pierce. 
I do not know if only one officer arrived before we 
left. I was paying too much attention to the one 
that was injured. 
Redirect Examination by Mr. Rawlings. 
When we were moving east on 21st South I saw 
the other car coming from the other direction about 
4 or 5 hundred feet off, and as we got close to the 
88 intersection, I turned my head to see if there was 
anything coming from the intersection, and there 
was a Ford coming. Yes, I saw the Oldsmobile first. 
That was way down the street. When I first saw the 
Ford, the Oldsmobile was entering the intersection. 
Yes, I think I must have seen the Ford when we 
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were about 4 or 5 hundred feet away. I guess we 
were y8 of a block west of the intersection when I 
first saw the Ford. I couldn't quite see whether 
the Ford or the Oldsmobile entered the intersection 
first, but it seems to me like the Oldsmobile entered 
89 the intersection first. It was light. The sun was 
about coming up, and the vision was good. I noticed 
that Clark Romney was thrown out of the Olds-
mobile, but I do not know what position the car was 
in when he was thrown out. He was thrown against 
90 the curb. He was lying with his head against the 
curb at about a 45 degree angle out. I saw the de-
fendant at the scene of the accident, but I did not 
see him get out of his Ford. 
Recross Examination by Mr. Richards. 
Mr. Rawlings did not explain the distance to me 
during the noon recess. That was my own rectifica-
tion. I have head noises, I can't hear very well, and 
91 I misunderstood the question. I did not misunder-
stand your question when I put X-1 and X-2. Yes, I 
put figures that I saw the Ford first. I saw the Ford 
coming-but the other car also-but I saw the 
Oldsmobile coming down the street 5 hundred feet 
or more. And after the crash, of course, we saw 
both. Yes, after the crash I tried to figure out the 
distance. Yes, when I was 4 or 5 hundred feet 
away I did see the Ford. Yes, at the stop sign, but 
I had seen the Oldsmobile previous to that time. I 
92 did not see the Oldsmobile where I put X-3 right 
after I had seen the Ford. That is the only thing 
I want to correct. 
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Redirect Examination by Mr. Rawlings. 
During the noon recess Mr. Rawlings asked a 
number of questions about where these cars were 
located. 
Q. This might be leading. Did I ask you to 
change your testimony in regards to what you testi-
fied to this Ford? 
Mr. Richards: Object to that as incompetent, 
irrelevant, immaterial and not proper redirect ex-
amination. 
93 The Court: Objection overruled. 
No, you told me to testify nothing else and asked 
me if I didn't see the Oldsmobile and saw the Ford, 
which I did. He asked me to testify to the accident 
just exactly as I saw it. 
KENNETH H. SILCOX, being first duly sworn, 
testified in behalf of the plaintiff as follows : 
Direct Examination by Mr. Rawlings. 
My name is Kenneth H. Silcox. Mr. Engstrum 
is my daddy-in-law, and was with me on February 
94 25, of this year, at about 7:00 in the morning, at 
which time I was driving a Chevrolet east on 21st 
South. As I approached the intersection of 3rd East 
Street, I noticed an Oldsmobile quite a little ways up 
the street. I observed it coming into the intersec-
tion. I have driven an automobile about nine years 
and have carefully observed automobiles traveling at 
certain rates of speed. In my opinion, the Olds-
mobile was not traveling over thirty miles an hour 
when it entered the intersection. I did not see the 
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Ford until it passed the stop sign. The Oldsmobile 
had just come into the intersection before I saw the 
Ford. The Ford hit the Oldsmobile broad-side. It 
went into the air, turned over twice, and came to 
rest between the road and the sidewalk. The motor 
was still running and I went and shut it off. I did not 
know Mr. Clark Romney, but I did see a man after 
the accident. The Ford after the accident was fac-
ing toward the south and the front end was caved in. 
There was a fellow and girl in it. The weather was 
96 fair. I believe the lights were burning on the Olds-
mobile, but I am not sure whether the lights were on 
the Ford. I said that the Ford was going about 40 
miles an hour, but that was just a guess. 
Cross Examination by Mr. Richards. 
I was driving the car but did not have any head 
lights on. The sun was not up, but it was light 
enough without lights. We had come from Riverton, 
and I had had the lights on before I stopped at 
97 Knowles Floral, Midvale, where I shut them off and 
did not turn them on again. I do not recollect the 
facts concerning the accident any better today than 
when I testified at the hearing on March 27. When 
I first saw the Ford I was coming up 21st South 
about three or four hundred feet away. I didn't 
see the Ford until it arrived at the stop sign. I 
saw the Oldsmobile first. That is how far away I 
was when I saw the Ford-just north of the stop 
98 sign. I did not see the stop sign at that time. I saw 
the Oldsmobile for some time coming down 21st 
South. After I saw the Ford I looked again and 
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saw the Oldsmobile just entering the intersection 
that is crossing the east curb line of 3rd East Street. 
I guessed at the speed of the cars first when they 
asked me for my story. That was the second day 
99 after the accident. I testified at the preliminary 
hearing that I was unable to estimate the speed of 
either the Ford or the Oldsmobile, that it was just a 
guess and that I guessed 40 miles for the Ford. I 
stopped about 15 feet from the intersection, im-_ 
mediately after the crash. As the cars came to-
99 gether the Ford struck the center of the Oldsmobile 
and the Oldsmobile rose up in the front. Both front 
100 wheels went about 5 to 6 feet up in the air. It 
turned over and I do not know whether it struck the 
ground until it lit on its wheels, although it looked 
like the front end might have struck first and then 
turned over again. I don't know whether the wheels 
101 went up that far, but I could see plenty of daylight 
under it. There was no other traffic on 3rd East 
or 21st South at that time. The Ford did not go 
far after the impact. It turned around. I did not 
watch it very closely after it hit because I was 
watching the Oldsmobile. I saw it after the acci-
.f. 102 dent and it hardly moved out of its tracks, only 
just turned around. 
Redirect Examination by Mr. Rawlings. 
Yes, I said that the spot I indicated for the cars 
was just a guess. I made the guess on what I ob-
served. I based the guess on seeing the distance the 
cars came. I saw the Oldsmobile come at least two 
or three hundred feet. It is from this observation 
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that I based my guess. It is pretty hard to guess 
the speed of a car. I talked to Mr. Pierce, the officer, 
at my place. I remember him asking me what was 
the speed of the Oldsmobile and the Ford car. 
106 Q. What speed did you tell Mr. Pierce that the 
Ford car was traveling at at that time. 
Mr. Richards: I object to that as incompetent, 
irrelevant and immaterial. 
A. I told Mr. Pierce I did not know the speed 
of the Ford, but in my judgment and my guess that 
it was 40 miles an hour, but I did not know for sure. 
That was just a guess. I told him between 40 and 
45 miles an hour and that the Oldsmobile was going 
about 30 miles an hour. That was two days after the 
accident. 
108 L. W. PIERCE, being first duly sworn, testi-
fied in behalf of the plaintiff as follows: 
Direct Examination by Mr. Rawlings. 
My name is L. W. Pierce. I reside at 940 Lake 
108 Street. I am traffic accident investigator of the 
Police Department of Salt Lake City. I have been 
on that detail since March, 1937. I do not have 
charge of it, but I am an investigator. I investi-
gated a collision at the intersection of 21st South and 
109 3rd East on the 25th day of February. Officer Van 
Ballegooie went with me. When we arrived there 
the Ford V-8 was headed in a north-easterly direc-
tion. At the time of the investigation I made certain 
measurements and observations from which I made 
the drawing marked Exhibit "C". I made the sketch 
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110 myself, and it is made to scale, and from that I made 
the drawing on the blackboard. This street repre-
sents 21st South at the intersection of 3rd East. 
This is east on 21st South and west on 21st South. 
These lines here represent the lines painted in the 
street, the center lines, and these two go through 
the intersection, but the outside lines don't. This 
outer line and the one near the curbing or parking 
lane doesn't continue through the intersection. It 
111 is a 6 lane highway. When we arrived there the 
Ford was located in the position shown on the map, 
and Mr. Anderson and the young lady sitting in the 
Ford car. Mr. Anderson was behind the driver's 
seat. Farther down the street was an Oldsmobile 
standing on its wheels, the front end down off the 
curb, the back wheels were up on the curb. At a 
point 16 feet east of the Oldsmobile there was a 
man lying in the street. I later learnP.d that it was 
Clark Romney. His feet and body were in the 
street, and his head was resting just on the curb. 
Leading into the intersection on 21st South and 
going in a northerly direction were some heavy tire 
marks. These tire marks were 44 feet long; they 
ended at a point 5 feet north of the center double 
112 line of 21st South. From there one of these marks 
went in the form of an arc and extended in a 
northwesterly direction for 14 feet. The front of 
the Ford automobile was 17 feet from the end of 
the west brake marking and there were 4 skid marks 
of 44 feet. The Ford was a four-wheel brake car. 
The front one of the skid marks started 4 feet from 
the south curb line and the other was 9 feet farther 
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back. There was a stop sign that morning at the 
intersection of 21st South and 3rd East, which is 
indicated on the drawing. This street has a curb that 
just goes around the corner; then there is a small 
dirt bank that extends South about 24 feet, after 
which the street widens out. There setting right 
113 in the small bank was the standard reflector stop 
sign. I do not know the size of it, but it was a 
hexagonal size standing on a six foot four by four 
post. There was written on it, "Stop," and 
"Through Street". It stands 24 feet south of the 
south curb line of 21st South. The skid marks did 
start about 11 feet North of the stop sign. In my 
observations I determined that the point of impact 
was at the place indicated by "X", with a circle 
114 around it. I determined that the whole front end 
of the Ford car hit the Oldsmobile. At a point be-
ginning 21 feet from the place where the brake 
mark stopped, there were two large tire burns in the 
form of an arc; one was 26 feet long, and the other 
was 20 feet long. I couldn't find any beyond that 
point. Beginning at that point to a point nineteen 
feet further west, the pavement right on the north 
painted line and on the curb was all gouged out and 
was full of green paint for a distance of fifteen feet. 
The color of the Oldsmobile was green. I did not 
observe right on top of the Oldsmobile. I did ob-
serve a portion of the damage to the top. The part 
in front, just above the windshield, was badly dam-
aged on the left front corner. The grill and radiator 
was broken out. The distance from the point where 
the impact occurred, that is from the left front 
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wheel of the Ford to the front end of the Olds-
mobile, was 78 feet. Officer Van Ballegooie stood 
at one point and I read the tape and took Mr. Ander-
son with me. The defendant was with me when we 
115 made the measurements. Mr. Romney was put in 
an ambulance and taken to St. Mark's Hospital. I 
did not see him after that. 
As an investigator for the Salt Lake Police 
Department I have had the occasion to determine the 
speeds that automobiles have been traveling, after 
taking into consideration skid marks, weights of 
cars and other matters. We have a formula for this 
matter. Yes, I made a particular study in that re-
gard. The formula we used was from the North-
western University School of Engineering. We at-
tended school at California held by Lieutenant 
Kremel from the Northwestern University. I also 
116 attended school at Pinecrest last year taught by the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police and 
received instructions from Sergeant Loveless of the 
Indiana State Police. The formula used at both 
these schools was the Northwestern University 
formula. It is the length of the tire marks times 
the coefficient of friction times a weight distribution 
of the automobiles times the number of tires that are 
117 holding. That would give you your product. You 
then take the square root of your product times a 
constant of 5.46 which will equal the miles per hour. 
I have made practical applications of this formula 
hundreds of times and the formula checked ac-
curately. The university gave us a coefficient of 
friction. The coefficient is determined by the sur-
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118 face of the highway. The highway at 21st South 
is what is known as a bituminous asphalt highway. 
The highway leading into the intersection on Third 
East is an oil and asphalt surface. Taking into con-
sideration the brake marks I used the formula to 
arrive at the speed that the Ford car would have 
been traveling had it come to a stop at X circle. The 
factors taken into consideration is the coefficient of 
the street and the weight distribution of the auto-
mobile. A Ford automobile has what is called a 
fifty-fifty weight distribution, or the front end is 
carrying 50% of the weight and the back 50%. 
Therefore, each wheel would be carrying 25% of 
119 the load. We do not consider the weight of the car. 
That does not make any difference. Then we con-
sider the coefficient of friction. I use .70. Bitum-
inous asphalt very conservatively will run from .74 
to .76. The reason I cut the coefficient down four 
points is because there was a slight bit of dirt on 
the highway right where Third East intersects with 
21st South and the brake marks went through the 
120 dirt. If the car came to a stop at X circle, it would 
have been travelling 30.35 miles per hour. I have 
taken photographs in relation to traffic accidents 
ever since 1937. We carry a kodak in the car. It 
is a 4.5 Graphite. I have been using that one since 
March, 1937. 
I had a conversation with the defendant at the 
place of the accident. He said the cars had not been 
moved; that they were in the position at which they 
121 came to rest. The diagram shows where the cars 
were when I arrived. Yes, I took a number of 
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photographs of the scene of the intersection and the 
cars. 'Yhat has been marked Exhibit "F" was 
taken in front of Streator-Smith on the 26th day of 
February. It is a photograph of the Oldsmobile 
automobile that I found at the scene of the accident. 
So far as I know the car was in the same condition 
at the time I took the picture as it was right after 
the accident. It looks just the same. 
;122 (Exhibit "F" was offered and received.) 
Exhibit "E" is a photograph of the front end 
of the Oldsmobile and in my recollection the car 
was in the same condition when this picture was 
taken as at the scene of the accident. 
(Exhibit "E" was offered and received.) 
What has been marked as Exhibit "A" is a 
photograph that I took of the left side of the Olds-
mobile sedan. 
(Exhibit "A" was offered and received.) 
123 \Vhat has been marked Exhibit "B" is a photo-
graph of the Ford. 
(Exhibit "B" was offered and received.) 
Exhibit "D" is a photograph of the Ford car. 
(Exhibit "D" was offered and received.) 
. 124 I took the picture marked Exhibit "H". It was 
taken on the 26th about noon. I was standing 132 
feet east of the east curb line of Third East Street, 
looking west. Yes, there was a light pole at the in-
tersection. However, the one you see in the picture 
was on the north side of the street. There is a pole 
a little further south than the stop sign on Third 
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East Street. The stop sign and pole in this picture, 
however, are on the north side of the street. 
I took the photograph marked Exhibit "G". I 
was standing 54 feet south of the stop sign and 
about in the center of Third East. I held the kodak 
125 approximately four feet from the ground. Third 
East is thirty-three feet wide. That is, where the 
curb is. I was standing just about in the center 
of Third East when I took the photograph. When 
I took this picture I held the camera slightly east 
and north so I could catch the stop sign and was 
held approximately four feet above the ground. 
Just how far east it was turned I do not know, just 
126 a few degrees. I just moved it over so I could find 
it and saw the stop sign and shot it. 
Mr. Rawlings: We offer in evidence Exhibit 
"G". 
Mr. Richards: We object to Exhibit "G" if it 
is offered for the purpose of showing what might 
be shown 54 feet back. It clearly shows-
The Court : The picture was explained. It 
would go more to the weight than the admissibility, 
Mr. Richards. Objection overruled. It may be re-
ceived. 
(Exhibit "H" was offered and received.) 
I had a conversation with the defendant in the 
evening at which conversation Mr. Beckstead was 
present. f had a statement with the defendant 
129 relative to the speed that he was driving his Ford 
car and about going through a stop sign. This con-
versation was reduced to writing. It is an accurate 
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statement of what he said on that subject matter. 
He stated: 
"I was driving about thirty-five or forty 
miles per hour as I approached 21st South. I 
was almost to the intersection when I noticed 
the stop sign. I didn't know there was a stop 
sign until I saw it. I applied my brakes and 
tried to stop, but I skidded into the other car." 
At that same time something was also said 
about the driver of the other car. He stated: 
"At the time of the impact I saw the other 
driver fall out of his car at about the same place 
as he was when the officer arrived. I don't 
think the car rolled over him." 
Cro.cls Examination by Mr. Ric:hards. 
The northerly end of the skid marks was five 
feet north of the center line. From the center line 
to the curb line is 35 feet. So it would be 35 plus 
five, or forty feet, and this mark would extend four 
feet south of the curb line. Forty-four feet is the 
full length of the skid mark. That is, the most 
northerly one, the one that extended furtherest 
north. There were four separate skid marks. The 
other skid mark stops nine feet back of the point X. 
Mr. Rawlings: I will offer this sketch which 
gives the scale, Exhibit "C", as an exact duplicate 
of the sketch on the board. 
Mr. Richards: I will agree to it, Mr. Rawlings, 
as soon as I get X-1, X-2 and X-3 on that. 
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132 Both skid marks are forty-four feet long. On 
Third East Street where it enters 21st South there 
is a concrete curb going around the corner. The 
stop sign is setting on the most southerly edge of 
the concrete. Then the street widens with dirt 
shoulders. Yes, there is a telephone pole in front 
of the stop sign a little further south and a little 
further east, about the width of the pole further 
east, that is the width of the telephone pole. In my 
judgment it would be about fifteen feet further 
133 south. It is very close to the stop sign. That is 
not put on the map. When I took the picture shown 
in Exhibit "G", I held the kodak so I would get a 
good picture of the stop sign. The purpose of the 
picture was to show the same. It was not taken to 
show what you would see driving down the street. 
I wanted to show the stop sign. It does not show 
a telephone pole. I did not have anything to do with 
working out the formula. I took the formula given 
to me by someone else and after applying certain 
facts came to the result I have given. It would alter 
the results of my formula if the first two brakes 
134 had taken hold for a certain distance and then the 
other brakes extended beyond. The coefficient of 
21st South was .74 and .76 and the coefficient of 
Third East which is asphalt would run about .68 to 
. 70. Yes, there was some gravel, some dirt, on Third 
East. The gravel was mostly pushed up onto the 
surface of 21st South. By the surface of 21st South, 
I mean after you leave the curb line. That is where 
most of it was. There was very little back in the 
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135 entrance. That would reduce the coefficient some 
and that is the reason I took .70 instead of .76. If 
it was on the .68 to .70 it would reduce it -very little. 
The skid marks caused by the spin, those being 14 
feet, were undoubtedly caused by the Ford from 
the forward motion of the west-bound car when the 
Ford went into its spin. Yes, I think when the cars 
came together that the forward motion of the Olds-
mobile twisted the Ford around so as to make it 
face in the direction it was and that would cause the 
skid marks. The stop sign is on a pole about six 
136 feet high. The lettering is six feet or over above 
the ground. The state law provides that your head-
lights are to show 42 inches above the ground at 
seventy-five feet. As you get closer, your lights 
may lower. That would depend, however, on how 
high the lights were on the car. If the lights were 
above 42 inches the light beam would be focused 
toward the ground further ahead. I do not know 
what height the right beam is on a Ford. I do not 
know what time I arrived at the accident. I re-
ceived the call about 7:00 A. M. and drove directly 
there. It took me five to seven minutes to get there. 
I was at the police station when the call came in. 
The weather that morning was clear and the visi-
bility was good. It was somewhat misty but not 
enough to impair visibility to any great extent. The 
pavement was dry. The sun was just coming up. 
It was broad daylight. The condition of Third East 
Street, of which I am somewhat familiar, isn't so 
bad. It is a fair road. It has chuck holes in it but 
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it is not bad. I don't know if prior to the time I 
inspected it, which was after the preliminary hear-
ing, it had been torn out putting in a gas pipe or 
sewer. It looked as though it had, but I don't know. 
Redirect E'xamination by Mr. Rawlings. 
138 When I took the photograph of the stop sign on 
the south side of 21st South I was 54 feet back and 
in my judgment the telephone pole is fifteen feet 
further south. I made observations to see whether 
it would block the view of a driver. It would not 
block the view of a driver coming down the proper 
lane. 
The back wheels of the Oldsmobile were on the 
curb and the front wheels were down on the street. 
139 By curb I mean between the curb and sidewalk. At 
one of the conversations I had with the defendant 
at the scene of the accident, he said he had to go to 
Magna to work. He said he had to take the young 
lady home and go to work at Magna that morning 
and that he had made arrangements with some 
woman to call Magna. 
140 Oh, yes, I know what you mean. He said that 
he was in a hurry to get the young lady home to 
get out to Magna to work. 
Recross Examination by Mr. Richards. 
I may not have remembered that at the pre-
liminary hearing. 
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ll \Vhereupon, SEYMOUR S. TAYLOR was called 
as a witness on behalf of plaintiff and being first 
duly sworn testified as follows: 
Direct Examination by Mr. Rawlings. 
My name is Seymour S. Taylor and I reside at 
Salt Lake City. At the present time I am employed 
by the Gallagher Company. For a period of years 
I have been interested in traffic safety. I have 
studied formulas by which the speed of a car might 
be determined by the tracks of the car, skid marks, 
coefficient of friction and weight of the car. I have 
a Bachelor of Science degree from the University 
of Utah in civil engineering and to obtain that de-
gree I wrote a thesis on traffic accidents in Salt 
Lake City. I have done further graquation work 
at the University of Kansas and the University of 
l2 Iowa. I have received my Master's Degree. I sub-
mitted a thesis to the University of Kansas also on 
the same subject of traffic accidents and investiga-
tions and the determination of speed of vehicles in-
volved in accidents and collisions. I have been em-
ployed as· consultant by Kansas City and also I have 
done some corresponding consulting work with Los 
Angeles, Boston and Chicago. This employment per-
tains to general traffic problems but was mainly 
based on accidents that had happened and engineer-
ing analysis of . these accidents. I was also con-
nected with General Motors Proving Ground and 
observed experiments in which these formulas were 
used. I did some actual work with them and I have 
,3 also studied photos quite carefully that were made 
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of tests they performed for the purpose of de-
termining damage to vehicles. The purpose of the 
tests at General Motors was to test the strength of 
various types of construction. Cars were placed on 
an incline to give them a predetermined speed and 
then were allowed to collide with other vehicles also 
moving at predetermined speeds. Other times they 
were run into solid walls at various speeds. The 
longest period I was at General Motors was three 
weeks but over a period of the last five years I have 
been there four times and spent probably a total of 
three months there. From the formula I have given 
you I am able to determine the speed of a car. 
I have examined Exhibit "C" and have made 
an analysis of the situation so far as speed is con-
cerned from the sketch itself, skid marks and type 
144 of road. I also took into consideration the condition 
of the two cars. I examined both cars on the 28th 
of February. I saw the Ford at Petty Motor and 
the Oldsmobile at Streator-Smith. 
Exhibits "A", "E" and "F" are photographs of 
the Oldsmobile that I examined and Exhibits "B" 
and "D" are photographs of the Ford that I ex-
amined. In determining the speed of the car I took 
into consideration the wheel marks or tire marks 
as shown on the sketch being forty-four feet in dis-
145 tance before the point of impact. I can tell from 
the tire marks the speed that the car was travelling 
when the brakes first went on had the the car come 
to a stop at the point of impact. Using my formula 
and taking into consideration the fact that there 
were skid marks at a distance of twenty-four feet 
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on 21st South and nine feet on Third East. I can 
tell the amount that the speed was decreased while 
the brakes were applied. I have also examined the 
construction of 21st South and Third East. The 
skid marks were not all there when I examined it 
two days after the accident so I U8ed the figur-es 
146 given me by Officer Pierce. The other element I 
used in connection with the formula is the coeffi-
cient of friction between the tires and pavement and 
the length of the marks. I have made practical 
applications of this formula. 
I was with a party testing approximately twelve 
cars with Ray Bestus Company on various types of 
pavement, various cars, various types of tires, to 
determine the coefficient of friction between those 
tires and the different types of pavement. The co-
efficient of friction that I used was .7. During the 
time that the brakes of the Ford were locked the 
wheels were sliding, the speed was decreased ap-
proximately thirty-three miles per hour. I am able 
to determine from my studies and have an opinion 
147 after making observations of the automobiles and 
a study of the surface of the two highways, 21st 
South and Third East, and other elements that I 
took into consideration, the speed that the Ford car 
was going as it entered the intersection. 
Exhibit "C" is a diagram that I prepared to 
scale. The total energy of any moving body is well 
148 known according to our laws of physics to be de-
termined if the mass of the moving body is known 
and its speed. Similarly, if we can determine the 
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total energy of the moving body and know its mass, 
its weight, we can determine its speed. 
155 I have given you the formula that showed the 
decrease of speed of the car over the forty-four feet 
as evidenced by the skid marks and I have a satis-
factory opinion as to the speed the car was going at 
the time the brakes were first applied. That opinion 
is made up of two factors. One is my conclusion 
as to the decrease at the point of impact and the 
other is the conclusion as to what happened after 
the impact. 
156 In arriving at proposition No. 2, the decrease 
of speed from the impact, I have taken into consid-
eration No. 1, the damage and extent done to the 
Ford car; No.2, consideration of the extent of dam-
age to the Oldsmobile car; No. 3, consideration of 
the amount of energy involved in forcing the Olds-
mobile to the pavement so that it leaped into the 
air; No. 4, the amount of energy involved in forcing 
the Oldsmobile from its intended path to a path ten 
feet distant, approximately; No. 5, the energy in-
volved by the movement of the Ford after the im-
pact to its position of rest. This is all I am con-
sidering. 
157 I can determine by formula the energy involved 
in forcing the car to the pavement so as to make it 
jump into the air. The formula is foot pounds of 
energy are equal to the weight involved multiplied 
by the distance through which that weight acts, 
which is simply the weight of the car times the 
distance. This is a mathematical, physical formula. 
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It is a formula studied in all of the better schools. 
I can determine by the same formula the energy 
involved in forcing the Oldsmobile car from its in-
tended path to the other path. It is an accepted 
formula worked out on a mathematical basis and 
adopted by all schools. I have seen this formula 
· 8 put to practical operation. I can determine by 
formula the energy involved in the movement of 
the Ford car as it skids around into its rest po-
sition. That formula is based on the weight of 
the car, the coefficient of friction between the tires 
and the pavement and the distance through which 
the car moves, which is also a recognized formula. 
That leaves damage as the other proposition. 
Distribution of weight on the various wheels 
will change the coefficient of friction. I do not use 
i9 a distribution of weight formula. There is no 
formula for determining the energy required to 
damage a car to a certain extent. That is the only 
other element that we have, the dama.ge to the two 
cars. 
I cannot arrive at the accurate speed that the 
Ford was travelling at the time the brakes were 
applied without that element. Leaving out the ques-
tion of damage, I have an opinion as to the speed 
the Ford was travelling when the brakes were ap-
plied. I can give the approximate speed and taking 
n 100 as being the accurate speed, leaving out the 
consideration of damage, my estimate would be 90% 
or 95% accurate. I do not mean that the speed will 
be 95% of the total speed because I have not been 
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allowed to consider the damage but it would be 
95% accurate without considering the damage. 
163 I stated the other day that I had an opinion 
relative to the speed that the Ford V -8 was traveling 
at the time that the brakes were applied on Third 
East as it entered the intersection of 21st South and 
3rd East. I examined the cars on the 28th of Feb-
ruary and went to the scene of the accident on the 
29th. At that time I had not seen the sketch of 
the accident and the placement of the cars. At the 
time I visited the place of the accident I made ob-
165 servations as to the surface of the road at Third 
East and at the point where skid marks appeared 
that were later called to my attention on the sketch. 
I also made an observation of the surface of the 
highway known as 21st South Street. I made an ob-
servation as to whether at that highway there was 
an incline or decline. I examined the tires of the 
two cars and paid particular attention to the in-
flation of the tires. 
It is a universally adopted formula by which 
the degree of slowing down in the speed of an auto-
mobile may be determined from the brake marks. 
The formula for speed in miles per hour is equal to 
5.5 times the square root of the coefficient of friction 
times the brake marks, assuming all four wheels are 
sliding. That formula has been accepted generally 
in the United States. 
Mr. Richards: Object to that as a conclusion 
of the witness, and move it be stricken. 
The Court: Objection overruled. It is a con· 
elusion, but I believe he is qualified. 
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166 \Vith that formula I have performed more than 
one hundred experiments in testing. There are sev-
eral other formulas but they resolve to the same 
thing. This formula that I have given is derived 
from the others. It is simply simplified to give the 
speed in miles per hour, not speed per second. 
I haYe seen Exhibit "C" before, which is the 
sketch prepared by Mr. Peirce. I made a larger 
sketch from Exhibit "C", drawn to scale. That is 
167 the one I was testifying from yesterday. 
(Exhibit "C" offered in evidence.) 
Mr. Richards: I have no objection except that 
it doesn't show all of the points around the acci-
dent. \Vith the understanding that the X's will be 
placed on with the notations of distances-as I un-
derstand the map is not large enough to permit them 
to be placed on according to scale, and show the 
telephone pole. 
Mr. Rawlings: We will agree that those may 
be placed in this exhibit by Mr. Richards. 
(Exhibit "C" admitted.) 
What has been marked Exhibit "I" is a sketch 
168 that I drafted myself. It is drawn to scale. 
Exhibit "I" is offered in evidence and re-
ceived with the understanding that it is merely an 
enlargement so that the witness can testify a little 
more accurately and is merely for the use of this wit-
ness and for no other purpose. 
I saw Exhibit "C" about the first of March. I 
considered the matters of distances, placement of 
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cars, roads and other elements contained on the 
sketch. I was advised what the boxes numbered 1 
169 and 2 represent. I considered the tire marks. 
Q. Mr. Taylor, taking into consideration your 
investigation and observations made at the intersec-
tion of 21st South and 3rd East, taking into consid-
eration the sketch, Exhibit "C", which I have called 
to y,our .attention, and which you say you have dis-
cussed with Officer Peirce, taking into consideration 
your observation of the automobiles which you have 
stated, I think, that you observed, the Ford V-8 and 
the Oldsmobile which were involved in the accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Taking into consideration the evidence in 
addition to the items which I have mentioned-
Mr. Richards: Which evidence? 
Q. (Continued) I am just going to say it. That 
the Oldsmobile car turned over twice as it went from 
point Circle Z to the point which indicates the place 
where it came to a stop, indicated on the blackboard 
as "X-4"; taking into consideration the movement 
of the cars, as is reflected on the sk~tch Exhibit 
"C"-
Mr. Richards: I object to that as being indefi-
nite, the movement of the cars. 
170 Q. (Continued) And particularly the fact that 
the Ford car, after the impact turned around and 
was pointed in a northeasterly direction, and that 
the Oldsmobile came to rest with the two rear wheels 
over the curb, and pointed in a southwesterly direc-
tion, practically west-
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The Court: Rig·ht there, Mr. Rawlings, I have 
an objection that was made. I thought before you 
finished-but I don't think you have added anything 
since the objection was made with reference to the 
objection to the movement of the cars. By that do 
you mean directional movement of the cars? 
Mr. Rawlings: Directional movement. 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
Q. You understand that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And taking into consideration that the evi-
dence that the Oldsmobile car came to rest at a point 
seventy-eight feet northwest and practically north 
from a direct line from the point of impact; taking 
into consideration the damage to the automobiles, the 
tread of the tires on both cars, the type of surfaces 
on both roads, and particularly in the intersection, 
the elevation transversed, if there were any eleva-
tion, the inflation of the tires, composition of the 
roads, the point of impact of the two cars, and any 
other evidence reflected on the sketch, Exhibit "C", 
have you an opinion as to the rate of speed that the 
car was traveling when the brakes were applied at 
point X-5. 
Mr. Richards: I object to that, your Honor. 
Mr. Rawlings : As is evidenced by the sketch. 
:171 Mr. Richards: I object to that question as be-
ing incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. The 
proper foundation has not been laid ; and that there 
are certain elements in the evidence that have not 
been taken into consideration; and there are certain 
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elements that he has taken into consideration that 
are not in evidence ; and that also his examination of 
the premises was of a time different than the time of 
the accident. There is no proof that the conditions 
were the same at that time as of the time of the acci-
dent; nor that the condition of the tires, the infla-
tion thereof, was the same at the time of the accident 
as they were at the time of his examination. 
The Court: He can answer this question "Yes" 
or "No", Mr. Richards. Then when he is asked for 
his opinion I will consider more seriously your ob-
jection, if you have one. 
A. Yes. 
The other elements I took into consideration in 
arriving at this opinion were the weight of the two 
cars, the total surface of friction between the tires 
and the surface, and no other elements except the use 
172 of the formula mentioned the other day. 
Q. You say you have an opinion. All right, 
now will you give us your opinion of the speed the 
car was traveling at the time that the brakes were 
applied, as is evidenced by the sketch, on 3rd East? 
Mr. Richards: May we have the same objection 
I made to the previous question. 
173 The inflation of the tires made no difference. 
The tread of the tires is a factor. 
Q. The tread of the tires is a factor. Will you 
describe, or give us the tread of the automobiles that 
you observed. 
Mr. Richards: Object to that as immaterial and 
incompetent. 
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Q. And designate each car. 
Mr. Richards: \Vhen did he examine it? 
1\Ir. Rawlings: The 28th. 
Mr. Richards: Object to it as incompetent, ir-
relevant and immaterial. The conditions may have 
been entirely different after-it undoubtedly was. 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
The tires on the Ford car were practically new. 
The tread was good on all four tires. The tires on 
the Oldsmobile were pretty well worn with the excep-
tion of one rear tire which was a little newer than 
the others. The weight of the cars enters into my 
computation. I know the shipping weight of the 
17 4 automobile. The shipping weight of a car is the 
weight without any gasoline, oil, accessories or ex-
tras or passengers. 
Q. What is the weight? 
Mr. Richards: Object to it as immaterial. 
The Court: I think the factor I mentioned or 
175 suggested is probably a matter of rebuttal, if it 
exists. Objection overruled. You may answer. 
A. The weight of the Ford car is 2,927 pounds 
shipping weight; and the shipping weight of the 
Oldsmobile 3,185 pounds, approximately. I think it 
is given on the sketch-it is shown. 
Q. Now, will you give us your opinion as to the 
speed the car was traveling when the brakes were 
applied on 3rd East? 
Mr. Richards: I would like the same objection 
as I made to the previous question; or I will restate 
it. 
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The Court: No, you may have the same objec-
tion, if you want to make your record on it that way, 
and the court will consider your objection previously 
made as going to this question. Are there any 
factors that you took into consideration in ascertain-
ing the speed of this Ford car at the time the brakes 
were applied, which have not been mentioned by Mr. 
Rawlings in his question to you? 
A. The extent of the damage to each car. 
There is no formula which can be used to arrive 
at a mathematical exactitude of the dissipation of 
energy in connection with the damaging of the cars. 
I base my opinion as to the crushing effect of the 
automobiles on the basis of extensive tests that we 
176 made at General Motors Proving Ground and at 
Iowa State University. 
By the Court : 
Those are the tests I assisted in and referred to 
yesterday. A measurement was always made. A 
comparison of damage was made at various speeds 
and under various conditions to determine the extent 
of the damage. I have conducted an experiment 
with an Oldsmobile of this model and year. I have 
not made the experiment with a Ford of this model 
and year. An Oldsmobile but not a Ford. In using 
this factor in determining the speed that the Ford 
was going at the time the brakes were applied I 
merely estimate the amount of energy dissipated by 
the impact of the two cars, which estimate is based 
177 upon my experience. As I understood the question it 
was not to include the damage to the car and I esti-
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mated that I could come closer than 95% right with-
out the damage. 
The Court: Objection overruled. The witness 
may answer and you may save your record on it, Mr. 
Richards. 
Q. Do you recall the question asked? 
A. Regarding the speed, including the dam-
age? 
..... :::::178 A. 59.3 miles per hour. 
Cross Examination by Mr. Richards. 
I have not been in court during all of the trial. 
I came in yesterday afternoon. Mr. Peirce was the 
first witness after I came in. I heard your cross ex-
amination of Mr. Peirce and that is all of his evi-
dence I heard. I did not hear the evidence of the 
other witnesses. The opinion I have given is taking 
into consideration certain information Mr. Peirce 
gave to me at some other time. I read the state-
ment of the witnesses he has in his police report and 
that is where I got my facts from with the .exception 
of the facts Mr. Rawlings has shown on the board 
179 and my own observations. I did not examine the 
highway until approximately February 29th. That 
was the first time I examined it. I have examined it 
since that time. To determine an incline or decline 
of a highway I have an instrument on my car. When 
I examined Third East Street, the street looked dry. 
It was black asphalt pavement on 21st South and on 
Third East it was an oil surface. There was a small 
portion of loose gravel in the center of the inter-
section. I do not know how much loose gravel there 
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180 was on the day of the accident. My opinion is based 
on what I saw at the time I examined it. I made al-
lowance in regards to friction but I based that on 
what I found when I examined it. I figured approxi-
mately the speed of the Oldsmobile from several fac-
tors at 37 miles per hour. When I say "approxi-
mately," I mean that would be about 90% correct. I 
figured the Ford a little closer because the movement 
of the Ford after the impact was less and not as 
complicated as the movements of the Oldsmobile. 
181 The skid marks I figured as a reduction of speed at 
30.5. In the 14 foot skid marks I took into considera-
tion and added it to the Ford's speed. That is, a por-
tion of the 14 foot skid marks. This made a reduc-
tion of about three iniles per hour. The momentum 
of the Oldsmobile would assist the Ford in swinging 
182 around and I took that into consideration. The dis-
tance mentioned in the direction of the Oldsmobile 
could be accredited to the Oldsmobile whereas the 
distance moved in the direction of the Ford could be 
accredited to the Ford. It is true that if the Ford 
came to rest and the Oldsmobile hooked on, the 
momentum of the Oldsmobile could advance the Ford 
to some extent in the same direction that it was go-
ing. From a study of the photographs and experience 
in similar accidents I would say that the Oldsmobile 
did not catch the Ford with part of it and throw it. 
Yes, I have seen accidents very nearly the same as 
this. That is, one car going 59 miles per hour and 
the other going 37 and ·striking under the same con-
ditions and causing the same result. I have not seen 
an Oldsmobile hit a Ford but have seen a car with 
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the same weight. The construction of different cars 
makes a difference but the chassis is practically the 
same on new cars. The body cushions the impact 
183 but it does not take the impact. I doubt if it would 
give something to hang on to. I did not use the same 
formula for figuring the speed of the Oldsmobile be-
cause there are no brake marks. The skid marks of 
26 feet I applied to the Oldsmobile. That is, the 
straight portion. The arc was contributed possibly 
by the change in direction. Taking the speed at 
184 33.5 up to the arc in the 14 foot skids to make up 
the 59 miles per hour, I take into consideration the 
direction over to here in the air, is the product of 
the weight of that car by the distance which it 
travels in the air. The distance is the perpendicular 
distance to the intended direction of travel over to 
a point approximately the center of where the skid 
marks begin. As to whether the Oldsmobile was 
absolutely free and clear, that is all four wheels off 
the pavement from the point of impact to the be-
ginning of the skid marks, which are marked 20 
and 26 feet, I take it that if they had not been there 
would be some indications on the pavement where 
the wheels had been touching. No, there are no 
skid marks down 21st South but anything in the air 
hitting the pavement would leave a mark, of any 
:. 185 weight. It would have to go one or two feet to 
leave a mark. Every time the car goes over a bump, 
if it goes sufficiently high it would leave a mark 
on the pavement where the wheels come down. It 
would leave a definite mark if the distribution of 
weight was the same as in this case. By that I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-46-
mean that the heavy portions of the car that are in 
the air tend to go to the ground first so that the 
front end or front wheels in the air would hit first. 
If the evidence showed that only two wheels left the 
ground, that would make a difference in my cal-
culations, and if the back wheels were still rolling 
on the ground, they would not make a mark. The 
186 distance I used for the car being in the air was ten 
feet and the energy consumed thereby would be 
3,400 pounds weight of the Oldsmobile down to that 
ten feet, or 34,000 pounds of energy. I have not 
broken that down to miles per hour. I use total 
energy. I didn't break each of them down. I 
summed them up and then arrived at my total factor. 
Q. Would it take long? 
A. No, I will do it right here on the board, 
if you want. 
Q. All right. 
A. (Witness figures on blackboard.) That is, 
if this were all the energy that were involved-it 
doesn't amount to quite that much, considered as a 
whole, so you really get into a larger-
V=5.5 /-E-
-w-
= 5.5 !3'4000 
. 3200 
= 17.9 miles per hour 
Q. What is your final figure? 
A. It is a square root. It is just a compli-
cation. When you take a square root of a number, 
you, for instance-if you double this number and 
that square root you don't double this, so it is better 
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-it is correct (indicating), this wouldn't be cor-
187 rect. Trying to break these down it would be cor-
rect; trying to determine the total energy at this 
point and applying it, if I add all these together 
then I would probably get 75 instead of 59.3. 
If only two wheels were off the ground, this 
34,000 would be about 28,000. It would not make 
any difference which two wheels were off the ground 
nor their height. The distance off the ground is not 
involved in this calculation but I used four feet 
off the ground the other day as that is another por-
tion of the energy. One witness' testimony which 
I read said five or six, but I use three. In consid-
188 ering that energy I considered all four wheels off 
the ground. The only difference this would make, if 
the car were raised so its mass were raised three 
feet, it wouldn't make any difference, but if the high 
point were only three feet off the ground, then it 
would cut the energy approximately in half. Even 
though the evidence indicated that the front end 
was all that could be seen off the ground five or six 
feet, I say I have never seen a collision of that kind 
where all four wheels did not go off the ground. 
By the downward force I mean the force which 
pushed the Oldsmobile to the pavement, the weight 
of the Ford as it suddenly stopped pitches to the 
front, as anyone who drives a car knows. (Using 
the models in court as a demonstration.) To ex-
aggerate, these wheels might not come entirely off 
the ground but the springs would be raised so that 
:L89 the weight of the car is directed in a downward 
direction and the fact, from this photograph, that 
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this running board on the Oldsmobile, and every-
thing is pushed down, indicates that there was a 
force pushing down on this car so that the springs 
and tires of the other car were pushed down and 
acting as a catapult so that the car pushed down 
immediately after the impact. Then the spring 
motion of the two cars releases them and the car 
pushed down by reason of the tension in the springs 
and because the air in the tires is compressed, will 
come out into the air, and that is what forces it 
up three feet. Sometimes it is the combination of 
forcing down and lifting up. That is, if the car was 
low enough down so it could get under the other, 
which I do not think it would in this case, it would 
knock it up into the air like hitting a golf ball. The 
speed of the Oldsmobile would not have any ap-
190 preciable effect on it going up in the air. It is true 
that if a body is moving at quite a rate of speed 
and gets caught on something it has a tendency for 
its upper end to raise, particularly if it is struck 
towards the rear, but in this case the striking was 
practically in the center. 
Q. That wouldn't mean right instantly after 
the striking of the back fenders or door handles or 
something on the Oldsmobile, wouldn't stop some 
of that speed of the Oldsmobile and shoot it in the 
air-
A. No. 
Q. So that part of this raising would be the 
speed of the Oldsmobile? 
A. No. 
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Q. It wouldn't. You don't concern with that 
at all? 
A. Not appreciably. In the range of tests 
from twenty to sixty miles per hour of the car, 
which would be the yellow car, the Oldsmobile car 
in this case, the difference in the lift over that range 
was only approximately six inches, and the cars 
were lifted around five to five and one-half feet by a 
car going at sixty miles per hour. 
In the test that I have made there was only a 
difference of six inches in the height which the car 
jumped. We ranged the speed of the cars from 20 
191 to 60 miles an hour, with the other car going at a 
speed of sixty when it reaches the point of impact. 
That is, increasing its velocity. We tried other cases 
with a man at the wheel applying the brakes. I 
have never seen an accident where the front went 
up and the back didn't. I have seen the front go a 
little higher but both left the ground. We had tests 
having them hit at the point of gravity which is 
back about 3Y2 feet from the front axel and 24 
inches off the ground. This might vary some with 
L92 passengers and accessories in the car. The combi-
nation of gouge and paint marks was contributed 
to the speed of the Oldsmobile and the coefficient be-
tween metal and pavement is around 6/10. The 
gouges would probably increase this. I did not in-
crease it. However, it would not make the Olds-
mobile be going much faster. The difference of one 
or two points in coefficient does not change much. 
This distance of seventy-eight feet was used to de-
.93 termine the actual distance parallel to the direction 
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of travel of the Oldsmobile. The distance from 
where the skid marks are to where the car jumped 
over the curb, I contribute the loss of energy or 
speed to the Oldsmobile. I did not break that down, 
however. It would make a difference as to how the 
Oldsmobile struck the pavement in making its turns. 
194 I did not see it but I think I know from the photo-
graph and other experiences and the damage to the 
car that it was quite on its nose. Yes, I attributed 
to the Ford a portion of the damage to the Olds-
mobile. All of the damage which was done to the 
left side of the car and the damage that was done 
to the frame of the car in springing the frame out 
in the direction of the travel of the Ford and the 
tearing loose of its supports underneath the frame 
itself. If the car went up in the air six feet and 
dropped, it couldn't damage the frame by the fall 
to the extent of the way it was damaged. I mean 
that absolutely. The dropping of the drive shaft 
and so on possibly might have been done by that. 
195 I eliminated that part and considered it in de-
termining the speed of the Oldsmobile. But it wasn't 
a big factor. Taking the rule of physics where two 
forces are pulling in different directions, the re-
sultant will lie closer to the greater force. The rea-
son the Oldsmobile was not further north on Third 
196 East rather than west on Twenty-first South was 
because a large portion of the energy of the Ford 
had been dissipated in the brakes and another part 
of the energy was dissipated in the damage to the 
cars at the time of impact and that the speed and • 
force of the Oldsmobile was not retarded as much 
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as the Ford by the impact. The total swing of the 
97 Ford was not caused by the momentum of the Olds-
mobile. It might probably have been assisted by 
the Ford's wheels being cramped. I do not know 
whether it would have been assisted by the power of 
the motor carrying the Ford forward. This could 
not have had much bearing on the matter, though, 
as it only moved fourteen feet. From my exper-
ience, the time a man starts to put on his brakes 
and when they take a hold, and having brakes and 
the type of road and tires here involved, is prac-
~98 tically nil. Of course, if you are going sixty miles 
an hour and see an object and go to stop, before skid 
marks would appear there is a reaction time which 
is different with different drivers. There are 
formulas worked out for this. They are worked out 
the same as the other formulas from experience and 
practice. The paper you showed me is one I de-
veloped. At sixty miles an hour I have sixty-six 
feet. That is the so-called reaction time of %, second 
which is an average for drivers for ordinary con-
l99 ditions. The reaction time in this case would prob-
ably be much shorter. It all depends on the in-
dividual. It has been registered as low as .5 of a 
second. "Thinking distance" means the time you 
are coming down the street and you see something 
and you have got to stop and you have to flash to 
your brain and the brain back to the foot in order 
to apply the brake. That is, at sixty miles an hour 
you would go sixty-six feet in 3,4 of a second. And 
if you had somebody that thought a little slower 
than the average, it would extend to a greater time. 
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200 I contributed to the speed of the Ford all of 
the damage to the frame of the Oldsmobile that in-
dicated the direction of travel of the Ford. If a car 
fell hard on its nose, it would not bend the frame 
out if it had tires and springs to cushion the motion. 
By the time it got to the frame it was considerably 
damped out because of the action of the tires and 
springs and it wouldn't be a direct impact on the 
frame and chassis of the car. By cushioned I mean 
201 that some of the force had been absorbed. As to 
just how much, it is hard to tell. Once in the while 
there is a defect which would make a difference but 
I did not find a defect from my examination of the 
Oldsmobile. There wasn't any such bending out-
ward shown by the tests that I was a party to. The 
Oldsmobile is a 1935 model and we tested those cars 
in 1936. No, the question of crystalization would 
202 not make any difference. I never saw the Oldsmo-
bile before the accident and I do not know whether 
it had ever been in any other accident before. 
Redirect Examination by Mr. Rawlings. 
In the tests made I have never seen a Ford car 
used but we did use cars of approximately the same 
weight and construction as the Ford. From my 
203 examination of the Oldsmobile I saw that the near 
side of the car, the left side, on which it was struck, 
was smashed in considerably and on the far side 
the upright post was torn loose and the front door 
was torn from its hinges. The frame itself was 
bowed out approximately three inches from its 
normal position and the X frame was torn loose 
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from the gusset plate, the rivets were torn out and 
the plate which supports the motor in the knee 
action was also torn in the near side and it was quite 
washboardy near the center. The tires and wheels 
were not damaged. The main damage as far as 
energy which was involved is concerned was to the 
frame itself which was constructed of pressed steel 
shapes and supported by an X frame riveted to the 
side. By an X frame I mean that the X meets the 
four corners of the frame back of the motor. The 
X frame is constructed of steel sections which have 
been pressed into shape. The channel is constructed 
204 of approximately 3/32 thick material, bent into a 
channel "C" shaped, which is the main member on 
each side of the frame. Both were bowed, the near 
one more than the far one and the X was torn from 
the gusset plate. They are a little better than three 
inches in width. That is, the long part of the "C" and 
the short part of the "C" is about 11,4 inches wide. 
The damage to the Ford was restricted to the front 
and the engine was not damaged. The radiator was 
pushed back and the bumper was pushed against 
the front tires and beyond. On one side it was 
skewed and the support to the bumpers on one side 
was completely crushed and one bolt was torn out. 
The frame beyond the front axle was not harmed. 
The bumper took a good deal of the shock as it is 
so designed. 
Recross Examination by Mr. Richards. 
The Ford shows that something took a hold of 
the right side and pulled it to the left. Very likely 
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205 that was the rear that was probably up here mo-
mentarily and slipped along. I would not say that 
it hooked on. I would say that you got a crushing 
action which isn't very much in order to crush 
twenty gauge fenders. Yes, you can make the front 
of a car look pretty bad with very little damage. 
As near as I can tell, the engine was pushed back 
but I did not work on the car. When a car is pushed 
down to the pavement, as I have described the Ford 
pushed the Oldsmobile down, usually the tires grip 
the pavement with such force that they don't move 
enough to burn any rubber and the forward motion 
would not make a mark. Sometimes they do move, 
however. So a mark would not be made by pushing 
it down but by a force hitting its side. If it should 
bounce in the air two feet and drop to the pavement, 
it would leave a mark. 
206 IT IS STIPULATED between counsel that the 
south line of 21st South Street is the end of Salt 
Lake City limits and that the land lying south of 
that line is in Salt Lake County. 
Both parties rest. 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND 
DISMISSAL. 
207 Mr. Richards: Comes now the defendant, Jess 
Anderson, and moves this court for a directed ver-
dict, and also for a motion of dismissal in this case 
upon the following grounds : 
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1. That the defendant has never had a pre-
liminary hearing. 
2. That the Information does not state a cause 
of action, or crime against this defendant. 
3. That there is no evidence to support the 
charges alleged in the information, or any fact 
shown that the defendant wilfully, and with wanton 
disregard of the rights of others and without due 
caution and circumspection did endanger or kill 
Clark Romney. 
There is also no evidence to show that the per-
son who vvas in the automobile accident was Clark 
Romney. 
5. That there is clearly evidence to show that 
the injury to the person driving the Oldsmobile was 
caused by the wrongful and negligent act of that 
party, and that said party was not driving in a 
proper manner. 
The Court: By that you mean the sole proxi-
mate cause of the death was the act and conduct of 
the party driving the Oldsmobile. Is that what you 
mean? 
Mr. Richards : That is one ground though I 
was going a little lighter than that, due to their 
allegations. 
The Court: Just so I understand. I am not 
trying to tell you how to make your motion. 
Mr. Richards: I also make the further ground 
that the party injured in the Oldsmobile-such in-
juries were caused by the sole and personal acts of 
:08 the driver of the Oldsmobile. 
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The Court : Motion denied. 
Mr. Rawlings: Your Honor, I would like, at 
this time, to reopen the case for one bit of evidence 
which I think maybe should be presented to your 
Honor, and the jury, in respect to the stop sign. 
Mr. Richards : The defendant resists on the 
ground it prejudices the defendant, and we have al-
ready rested and closed our case, and also submitted 
our instructions to the court. 
Mr. Rawlings: I won't have any objection to 
them putting on any evidence they desire, after I 
conclude. 
The Court : You may make your record on it, 
Mr. Richards, in case the court is in error, but I will 
grant the motion over your objection. 
FOSTER KUNZ was called as a witness on be-
half of the plaintiff and after being first duly sworn 
testified as follows : 
My name is Foster Kunz and I reside at 145 
Third Avenue. I have lived in Salt Lake for about 
a year. I have been working for about a year for 
the State of Utah in the Traffic Safety Department 
with the State Road Commission during that period 
of time. I am Traffic Safety Engineer. It is my 
duty and responsibility to supervise matters per-
210 taining to the erection and maintenance of stop 
signs. I am familiar with the highway commonly 
known and designated as "Twenty-first South", par-
ticularly in the vicinity of Third East Street. Twen-
ty-first South Street is under the jurisdiction of the 
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State Road Commission so far as erection of state 
highway signs is concerned. 
Voir Dire Examination by Mr. Richards. 
211 I ''"as not there when it was erected and I did 
not see it erected. 
Further Direct Examination by Mr. Rawlings. 
212 The jurisdiction of the State Road Department 
to erect stop signs comes by virtue of statute. The 
signs are erected at Third East and Twenty-first 
South Street by our sign department. The sign de-
partment is under my direction. I have nine men 
in that department. I keep a record of the work that 
they do and the signs that they erect. That record 
is kept under my jurisdiction by those men. I have 
examined the records to determine by whom the 
sign at Twenty-first South and Third East was 
erected. 
Further Voir Dire Examination by Mr. Richards. 
213 I do not keep the record myself. It is kept by 
the sign shop foreman. 
By the Court: 
I do not check the record ordinarily for accur-
acy. I do not make any kind of inspection. I do go 
to see that the work is being done. 
By Mr. Rawlings: 
I did go and investigate to see if the stop sign 
was erected at 21st South at the time the project was 
completed on November 3, 1939. The road was 
widened in that vicinity and the improvements to the 
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road were made by the State Road Commission. 
After that was done, I checked to see if the signs 
were erected. I made a general inspection of the en-
tire project and all signs were erected in accordance 
with our log. The log provides that stop signs be 
erected on the southeast corner of that intersection. 
215 Q. Do you know whether or not the State Road 
Commission erected a stop sign at the intersection 
of Twenty-first South and Third East on the south-
east corner. 
Mr. Richards: I object to it as being incom-
petent, immaterial and not within the knowledge of 
this witness. 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
A. Yes, it did. 
It was erected between October 23rd and Nov-
ember 3rd. The sign shown in Exhibit "G" is one 
like our signs. I could not say definitely that it is 
the sign. It is a regular standard stop sign erected 
by the State of Utah. 
Cross Examination by Mr. Richards. 
I do not know the exact date I made the inspec-
tion but I always go over the projects after they have 
been signed. I do this within a week after. I re-
216 member I went over this in November, 1939. It is 
correct that all I know is that as Engineer of the 
Safety Department I ordered a stop sign to be put 
at that street and that thereafter was advised by a 
report that one had been put there and later I in-
spected it and there was a sign. 
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Mr. Richards: Your Honor, I move that his 
testimony be stricken on the ground that it is clearly 
shown it is not within his knowledge to testify that 
the sign was actually put there by the State Road 
Commission. 
The Court : Motion denied. 
(Both parties rest with the understanding that 
n 7 the motion of dismissal and for directed verdict 
heretofore made shall be considered as made after 
the introduction of this last testimony and that the 
same rulings made at that time are now made.) 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY. 
No.1. 
7-219 You are instructed that the defendant, Jess 
Anderson, is charged by the information which has 
been duly filed in this case with the crime of invol-
untary manslaughter, in substance committed as fol-
lows: That on the 25th day of February, 1940, at 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Jess 
Anderson, did unlawfully and without malice kill 
Clark Romney. 
No.2. 
:7-219 You are instructed that instruction No. 1 is not 
to be regarded by you as a statement of the facts 
proved in this case, but is to be regarded by you 
fl solely as a summarized statement of the essential al-
legations contained in the information. 
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You are instructed that to the charge contained 
in the information the defendant has entered a plea 
of not guilty. The plea of not guilty denies each 
and all of the essential allegations contained in the 
information and casts upon the State the burden 
of proving each and all of the essential allegations 
therein contained to your satisfaction beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. The mere fact that the defendant 
stands charged with a crime is not to be taken by 
you in and by itself as any evidence of his guilt. 
No.4. 
8-219 You are instructed that involuntary man-
9-220 
slaughter, insofar as material to this case, is defined 
by the laws of the State of Utah as the unlawful kill-
ing of a human being, without malice, in the com-
mission of an unlawful act not amounting to a 
felony, when such unlawful act is committed by the 
defendant in such manner as to evince on his part 
marked disregard for the safety of others, or reck-
lessness. 
No.5. 
You are instructed that the laws of the State of 
Utah in force on the 25th day of February, 1940, 
provide as follows : 
First: That it shall be unlawful for any person 
to drive any vehicle upon a~y highway carelessly and 
heedlessly in willful or wanton disregard of the 
rights and safety of others. 
Second: That it shall be unlawful for any 
person to drive any vehicle upon any highway with-
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out due caution and circumspection and at such a 
speed or in such a manner as to endanger any per-
son or property. 
Third: That it shall be unlawful for any per-
son to drive any vehicle upon any highway at a speed 
greater than is reasonable and prudent, having due 
regard for the traffic, surface and width of the 
highway and the hazards at intersections, and any 
other condition then existing. 
Fourth: That it shall be unlawful for any per-
son to drive any vehicle upon any highway at a speed 
which is greater than will permit the driver to exer-
cise proper control of the vehicle and to decrease 
speed or to stop, as may be necessary, to avoid col-
liding with any person, vehicle or other conveyance 
upon or entering the highway in compliance with the 
legal requirements and with the duty of drivers and 
other persons using the highway, to exercise due 
care. 
Fifth: That it shall be unlawful for any person 
to fail to stop in obedience to a stop sign, bearing the 
words "Stop" in letters of a size to be clearly legible 
from a distance of one hundred feet, placed at an 
intersection, which said stop sign is placed there by 
the State Road Commission or by the local authority 
having said intersection under its jurisdiction. 
You are further instructed that anyone violat-
ing any of the provisions of law as set forth above 
is guilty of the commission of an unlawful act not 
amounting to a felony. 
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No.6. 
10-221 You are instructed that before you can find the 
defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter as 
charged in the information you must believe from 
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt the fol-
lowing: 
First: That the defendant, Jess Anderson, at 
the time and place alleged in the information was 
driving and operating an automobile on said high-
way, and in so doing violated one or more of the pro-
visions of the statutes of the State of Utah set forth 
in instruction No. 5. 
Second : That in violating one or more of the 
provisions of the statute set forth in instruction 5, 
if you find such violation beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the defendant acted recklessly or in such a manner 
as to evince marked disregard for the safety of 
others. 
Third: That in so driving and operating his 
automobile, as set forth in paragraphs numbered 
"First" and "Second" of this instruction, the defend-
ant proximately caused the collision between his 
automobile and the automobile which was being 
operated by the deceased, Clark Romney. 
Fourth: That the said Clark Romney received 
injuries as a result of said collision from which he 
died within a year and a day from February 25th, 
1940. 
Fifth: That the killing of Clark Romney was 
directly and proximately caused, as that term is 
hereafter defined for you in these instructions, by 
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the violation of one or more of the provisions of the 
statute as set forth in instruction 5 committed in 
such a manner as to evince on the part of the defend-
ant marked disregard for the safety of others or 
recklessness. 
Sixth : That the killing of Clark Romney was 
without malice. 
You are further instructed that the burden is 
upon the State to convince you by evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt that all of the above enumerated 
elements of the crime of involuntary manslaughter 
are present in this case. If the State has failed to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt one or more of said 
enumerated elements set forth in this instruction 
then you must acquit the defendant. 
No. 6-A . 
You are instructed that if you believe from the 
evidence that the defendant, Jess Anderson, was 
guilty of an unlawful act or acts, not amounting to 
a felony, in the manner in which he operated his 
automobile at the time and place in question, and in 
the commission of such unlawful act or acts evinced 
a marked disregard for the safety of others, or reck-
lessness, but also believe from the evidence that such 
act or acts committed in such manner in no way 
proximately caused the collision of his automobile 
and the automobile of the deceased, Clark Romney, 
and the injuries to Clark Romney, then you may not 
find the defendant guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter, but must return a verdict of not guilty. 
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No.7. 
13-223 You are instructed that by the term "Proximate 
14-223 
15-223 
cause", as used in these instructions, is meant that 
cause which in a natural and continuous sequence, 
unbroken by any other cause, produced the injury 
and without which the injury would not have oc-
curred. 
No.8. 
You are instructed that the phrase "Wilful and 
wanton disregard for the rights and safety of 
others" means recklessness or marked disregard for 
the rights and safety of others. It does not involve 
an active, conscious or specific intent or determina-
tion on the part of the defendant to violate a law or 
to injure another. 
No. 8-A. 
You are instructed that in the crime of involun~ 
tary manslaughter, so far as material to this case, 
there must be a union or joint operation of the un-
lawful act and criminal negligence. And in this con-
nection criminal negligence means that the unlaw-
ful act must be done in such a manner as to more 
than constitute a mere thoughtless omission or slight 
deviation from the norm of prudent conduct. It 
must be reckless or in marked disregard for the 
safety of others. 
Throughout the whole of these instructions the 
terms "Reckless" and "Recklessness" mean conduct 
evincing marked disregard for the safety of others; 
that is; the terms as here used mean more than a 
mere thoughtless omission or slight deviation from 
prudent conduct. 
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No.9. 
16-22-! You are instructed that the mere fact that an 
accident happened and that the defendant was in-
volved therein is not to be taken by you as proof 
in and of itself that the defendant was at the time 
and place in question engaged in an unlawful act or 
acts, or that he acted recklessly or in such a manner 
as to evince a marked disregard for the safety of 
others. 
No. 10. 
17-224 You are instructed that the defendant in this 
18-224 
case had a right to go upon the witness stand and 
testify in his own behalf, if he chose so to do. The 
law, however, expressly provides that no presump-
tion adverse to him is to arise from the mere fact 
that the defendant has not availed himself of the 
privilege which the law gives him and should not be 
permitted by you to prejudice him in any way. 
No. 11. 
The Court charges you that it is the imperative 
and sworn duty of the jury to hear and determine 
this case on the testimony of the witnesses given on 
the trial. In determining questions of fact, you 
are not at liberty to indulge in conjectures not based 
on evidence introduced in the case; nor are you at 
liberty to follow your own ideas of what the law is 
or ought to be. On the contrary, you should look 
solely to the evidence for the facts, and to the in-
structions given you by the Court for the law, and 
return a verdict according to the facts established 
by the evidence and law laid down by the Court. 
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Sympathetic feelings have no place whatever in the 
trial of a case in a court of justice. You should dis-
regard all such influence and determine the case ac-
cording to the law and the evidence given you in 
oven court, and with fairness and impartiality. 
You should not consider, or be influenced by, 
any evidence offered but not admitted, nor any evi-
dence stricken out by the Court, but only such evi-
dence as has been admitted in the case. You should 
not consider, or be influenced by, any statement of 
counsel as to what the evidence is, unless they state 
it correctly, or by any statement of counsel of facts 
not shown in evidence, if any such has been made. 
You should not be influenced by any statements the 
court may have made in ruling upon questions of 
law or otherwise in your hearing, if any have been 
made, that seem to indicate any opinion upon any 
question of fact. 
No. 12. 
You are the sole judges of the weight of the 
evidence, the credibility of the witnesses and the 
facts. In weighing the testimony you may consider 
the bias of any witness, if any is shown, to testify 
in favor of or against either party; the interest, if 
any is shown, which any witness has or may have in 
the result of the trial. You may consider the appear-
ances of the witnesses on the witness stand, and any 
motive or probable motive which any witness may 
have to tell that which is not true, and from all the 
facts and circumstances given in evidence before you, 
determine what weight ought to be given to the tes-
timony of any witness. 
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You are not bound to believe all that the wit-
nesses may have testified to, nor are you bound to be-
lieve any witness; you may believe one witness as 
against many, or many witnesses as against one. 
In case there is a conflict in the testimony of the 
witnesses, it is your duty to reconcile such conflict 
so far as you can, but it is still for you to determine 
for yourselves where the ultimate truth of the case 
is. 
If you shall believe any witness has wilfully 
testified falsely, as to any material fact in the case, 
you are at liberty to disregard the whole of the testi-
mony of such witness, except as he may have been 
corroborated by credible witnesses or credible evi-
dence in the case. 
All presumptions of law, independent of evi-
dence, are in favor of innocence, and a man is pre-
sumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt. And in case of a reason-
able doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily 
shown, he is entitled to an acquittal. 
. 9-226 
By a reasonable doubt is meant a doubt based 
on reason, and which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence . 
And if, after an impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence in the case, you can 
candidly say that you are not satisfied of the defend-
ant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt; but if, after 
such impartial consideration and comparison of all 
the evidence, you can truthfully say that you have 
~ an abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt, such 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-68-
as you would be willing to act upon in the more 
weighty and important matters relating to your own 
affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. It must be 
a real, substantial doubt, and not one that is merely 
possible or imaginary. It should fairly, naturally 
and reasonably arise out of the evidence or lack of 
evidence in the case. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree 
of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the 
understandi:r:g of those who are bound to act con-
scientiously upon it. 
To warrant you in convicting the defendant, the 
evidence must, to your minds, exclude every reason-
able hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the 
defendant. That is to say, if after an entire consid-
eration and comparison of all the testimony in the 
case, you can reasonably explain the facts given in 
evidence on any reasonable ground other than the 
guilt of the defendant, you should acquit him. 
No. 13. 
19-227 These instructions, though numbered separately, 
are by the jury to be considered and construed as 
one connected whole. Each instruction should be 
read and understood in reference to and as a part of 
the entire charge and not as though one instruction 
separately were intended to present the whole law 
of the case upon any particular point. 
No. 14. 
When you retire to deliberate you should ap-
point one of your number foreman. Your verdict 
must be in writing, signed by your foreman, and 
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when found must be returned by you into Court. 
Your verdict in this case must be guilty of Involun-
tary Manslaughter as charged in the information, or 
not guilty, as your deliberations may result. 
In criminal cases it requires a unanimous con-
currence of all the jurors to find a verdict. 
M. J. BRONSON, Judge. 
Dated May 22, 1940. 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
EXCEPTIONS TO COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS. 
228 Mr. Richards: Comes now the defendant and 
excepts to the court giving the following instruc-
tions: 
Excepts to the whole of Instruction No. 4. 
229 Excepts to the whole of Instruction No. 5. 
Excepts to the first paragraph, No. 1, of In-
struction No. 5. 
Excepts to paragraph No. 2 of Instruction No. 5. 
Excepts to paragraph No. 3 of Instruction No. 5. 
Excepts to paragraph No. 4 of Instruction No. 5. 
The Court: Your reasons? 
Mr. Richards: Do you want me to state them? 
I don't think it is necessary for the record. I will 
tell you frankly-do you want this in the record? 
The Court : It is up to you. 
Mr. Richards : Excepts to the following portion 
of Instruction No. 5 : 
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"You are further instructed that anyone 
violating any of the provisions of law as set 
forth above is guilty of the commission of an 
unlawful act not amounting to a felony." 
Excepts to Instruction No. 6, and the whole 
thereof. 
Excepts to paragraph No. 1 of Instruction 
No.6. 
Excepts to the following portion of paragraph 
No. 1 of Instruction No. 6 : 
"And in so doing violated one or more of 
the provisions of the statutes of the State of 
Utah set forth in Instruction No. 5." 
Excepts to the second paragraph of Instruc-
tion No.6. 
Excepts particularly to the following portion of 
the second paragraph of Instruction No. 6 : 
"That in violating one or more of the provi-
sions of the statute set forth in Instruction 5." 
230 Excepts to the third paragraph of Instruction 
No.6. 
Excepts to the fifth paragraph of Instruction 
No.6. 
Excepts to the following portion of the fifth 
paragraph of Instruction No. 6 : 
"By the violation of one or more of the 
provisions of the statute as set forth in Instruc-
tion 5. 
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Excepts to Instruction No. 6-A, and the whole 
thereof. 
Excepts to the following portion of Instruc-
tion No. 6-A : 
"You are instructed that if you believe 
from the evidence that the defendant, Jess 
Anderson, was guilty of an unlawful act or acts, 
not amounting to a felony, in the manner in 
which he operated his automobile at the time 
and place in question." 
Excepts to Instruction No. 8, and the whole 
thereof. 
Excepts to the following portion of Instruction 
No.9: 
"Engaged in an unlawful act or acts." 
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give De-
fendant's Requested Instruction No. 1. 
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give De-
fendant's Requested Instruction No. 2. 
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give De-
fendant's Requested Instruction No. 3. 
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give De-
fendant's Requested Instruction No. 4. 
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give De-
fendant's Requested Instruction No. 5, marked as 
given. 
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give De-
fendant's Requested Instruction No. 6. 
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give De-
n fendant's Requested Instruction No. 7. 
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Excepts to the refusal of the court to give De-
fendant's Requested Instruction No. 8. 
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give De-
fendant's Requested Instruction No. 9. 
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give De-
fendant's Requested Instruction No. 10. 
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give De-
fendant's Requested Instruction No. 11. 
Excepts to the refusal of the court to give De-
fendant's Requested Instruction No. 12. 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
VERDICT. 
232 We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, find 
the defendant Jess Anderson guilty of involuntary 
manslaughter as charged in the information. 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS. 
No. 1. 
35 You are instructed that unless you find beyond a 
reasonable doubt from the evidence introduced in 
this case each and every one of the following: 
l. That the defendant, Jess Anderson, was 
driving the automobile at the time and place of the 
accident involved in this case. 
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~. That a person known as Clark Romney died 
as a result of injuries received in an automobile ac-
cident between a car driven by the defendant and a 
car in which the said Clark Romney was driving. 
3. That the accident was caused by reason of 
the fact that the defendant drove his automobile in 
excess of forty miles per hour immediately before he 
entered the intersection in question and because he 
failed to stop at a stop sign facing south on Third 
East Street at the intersection of said street with 
21st South Street. 
4. That the acts of failing to stop at the stop 
sign and driving in excess of forty miles per hour, 
taken into consideration with the surrounding cir-
cumstances such as the time of day, the amount of 
traffic upon said highway and the condition of said 
highway, are determined by you to be such acts as 
would be considered as driving in a reckless manner 
and with marked disregard for the rights of others, 
as otherwise defined and explained in these instruc-
tions; then your verdict must be not guilty. 
No.2. 
36 You are instructed that before you can find 
the defendant guilty you must find that he failed 
both to stop at a stop sign at which he was required 
to stop and was going in excess of at least forty 
miles per hour when he entered the intersection. 
No.5. 
l9 You are instructed that unless you find from the 
evidence that the stop sign on the east side of Third 
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East Street approximately 24 feet south of the south 
curb line of 21st South Street was erected by either 
the State Road Commission or the authorities of Salt 
Lake City, then you are instructed that the defend-
ant had no duty to stop at said sign and you shall not 
take into consideration his failure to stop at said in-
tersection. 
No.7. 
41 You are instructed that the laws of the state 
of Utah provide that where no special hazard exists 
the following speed limits shall be lawful: Outside 
of the business or residence districts, except as 
otherwise limited by this chapter, speeds at all times 
shall be reasonable and safe under the general con-
ditions prevailing upon the highway, providing such 
speed. shall not exceed fifty miles per hour. You 
are further instructed that business and residence 
districts are defined as follows : 
"Business District. The territory so desig-
nated by local authorities and clearly defined by 
signs posted on the highway at the limits of said 
districts. 
"Residence District. The territory within 
cities and towns other than the business dis-
tricts." 
No.8. 
42 You are instructed that if you find from the evi-
de~ce that the stop sign facing south on Third East 
Street is not in a position visible to drivers entering 
21st South Street and was not observed by the said 
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Jess Anderson, then you are instructed that your 
verdict must be in favor of the defendant, not guilty. 
No.9. 
l3 You are instructed that though one while driv-
ing an automobile may accidentally kill another, even 
though he be chargeable with some actionable negli-
gence, he is not guilty of the crime here charged 
unless his negligence is so gross and culpable as to 
indicate a callous disregard of human life and of 
the probable consequences of his act. 
No. 10. 
44 You are instructed that by the words "reckless-
ness and wanton disregard for the rights of others" 
is meant that the misconduct or negligence of the 
accused was of more reprehensible character than 
mere inadvertence or want of ordinary care. It 
must be that there was on his part either a willful 
intent to injure or that recklessness and wanton dis-
regard of the rights and safety of another or his 
property was such as would be equivalent to intent to 
injure. 
No. 12. 
4l6 You are instructed that if you find from the 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that said defend-
ant did fail to stop at the stop sign at Third East 
and 21st South Streets and that he was driving in 
excess of forty miles an hour and that such were 
the cause of the accident which resulted in the death 
of one Clark Romney, but you further find that the 
failing to stop at said stop sign and the going in 
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excess of forty miles an hour was not done by the 
said defendant, Jess Anderson, with a wilful and 
wanton disregard for the rights of others, then your 
verdict must be in favor of the defendant, not guilty. 
SETTLEMENT OF BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. 
238 The defendant herein proposes and serves the 
foregoing as and for its Bill of Exceptions herein, 
consisting of 177 pages. 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS, 
Attorney for Defendant. 
STIPULATION. 
239 The foregoing Bill of Exceptions is returned by 
the plaintiff to the defendant this 24th day of 
August, 1940, with no amendments offered or pro-
posed and it is stipulated that the foregoing Bill of 
Exceptions may be allowed and settled by the Court 
as a true and correct Bill of Exceptions in the within 
entitled action. 
Dated this 24th day of August, 1940. 
CALVIN W. RAWLINGS, 
By Brigham E. Roberts, 
Deputy, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS, 
Attorney for Defendant. 
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CERTIFICATE SETTLING BILL OF 
EXCEPTIONS. 
240 I, M. J. Bronson, District Judge who tried the 
51 
foregoing cause, do hereby certify that the above 
and foregoing Bill of Exceptions, consisting of 17 _____ _ 
pages numbered from 1 to 17 ______ , inclusive, together 
with plaintiff's Exhibits "A" to "I", contains all of 
the testimony and evidence offered, admitted or ad-
duced upon the trial of said cause, together with all 
of the objections and exceptions taken and correc-
tions made and all proceedings had during the trial 
thereof and contains sufficient reference to all ex-
hibits therein referred to to identify the same. 
There being no amendments thereto, said Bill of Ex-
ceptions is hereby approved, signed, settled and 
allowed as a true Bill of Exceptions in the cause of 
State of Utah vs. Jess Anderson, and the Clerk 
hereby ordered to file the same. 
Dated this 24th day of August, 1940. 
M. J. BRONSON, Judge. (Seal) 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO 
MOVE FOR NEW TRIAL. 
To the above named plaintiff and its attorney, Calvin 
W. Rawlings: 
YOU AND EACH OF YOU WILL PLEASE 
TAKE NOTICE that the above named defendant in-
tends to move the above entitled court to vacate and 
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set aside the verdict rendered in the above cause on 
the 23rd day of May, 1940, and to grant a new trial 
in said cause upon the following grounds, to-wit: 
1. That the Court misdirected the jury in mat-
ters of law. 
2. That the court erred in the decision of ques-
tions of law arising during the course of the trial, 
3. That the court did allow acts in the cause 
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defend-
ant. 
4. That the verdict is contrary to the law. 
5. That the verdict is contrary to the evidence. 
Dated this 25th day of May, 1940. 
Filed May 25, 1940. 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS, 
Attorney for Defendant. 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
52 MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT. 
Comes now the defendant above named and 
moves the above entitled Court to enter an order 
arresting the judgment rendered on the verdict in 
the above entitled matter upon the following grounds 
and for the following reasons : 
1. That the information does not charge the 
defendant with the commission of the offense for 
which he was tried in that said information charges 
voluntary manslaughter, whereas, said defendant 
was tried for involuntary manslaughter. 
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2. That the information was filed without the 
defendant first having had or waived a preliminary 
examination in that the original complaint filed by 
the County Attorney's office does not state or charge 
that the defendant has committed any crime what-
soever. 
3. That the prosecuting attorney did not have 
authority to file the information for the reason that 
said defendant had neither had nor waived a pre-
liminary examination in that the complaint filed by 
the County Attorney's office upon which a prelim-
inary examination was held did not state that the 
defendant had committed any crime whatsoever and 
particularly did not state that said defendant had 
committed the crime of involuntary manslaughter or 
voluntary manslaughter. 
Said motion will be based upon the files and 
records in the above entitled cause. 
Filed June 3, 1940. 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS, 
Attorney for Defendant. 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
MINUTE ORDER. 
Whereupon said motions are argued to the 
Court by respective counsel and submitted and the 
Court being now fully advised in the premises, 
ordered that said motion in arrest of judgment and 
~: motion for a new trial be and the same hereby are 
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denied. Whereupon the defendant is asked if he 
has any legal cause to show why judgment and sen-
tence should not be pronounced at this time and the 
defendant having answered that he has none, the 
Court now pronounces the following judgment and 
sentence: 
The judgment and sentence of this Court 
is that you Jess Anderson be confined and im-
prisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail for a 
period of 12 months for the crime of Involun-
tary Manslaughter of which you were found 
guilty. 
(Title of Court and Cause.) 
CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE 
CAUSE. 
Upon motion of Jess Andersen, defendant in the 
above named case, for a certificate of probable cause, 
and in the opinion of the court there being probable 
cause therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that in the 
opinion of the court there is probable cause for 
appeal in this cause and the defendant is released 
without bond to the custody of Dan Beckstead. 
Dated this 22nd day of June, 1940. 
M. J. BRONSON, District Judge. 
Filed June 22, 1940. 
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(Title of Court and Cause.) 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, WILLIAM J. KORTH, Clerk of the above en-
titled Court, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing and hereto attached files contain all the 
original papers filed in this Court in the above en-
titled case, including the original Bill of Exceptions 
and Notice of Appeal, together with true copies of 
original orders made by the Court the whole con-
stituting the judgment Roll therein. And that the 
same is a full, true and correct transcript of the 
record as it appears in my office. 
I further certify that a Certificate of Probate 
Cause, duly signed by the Honorable M. J. Bron-
son, Judge, was filed on the 22nd day of June, A. D. 
1940. I further certify that an Order of Court was 
entered on the 22nd day of June releasing the de-
fendant Jess Anderson on his own recognizance. 
And I further certify that said Transcript is 
by me transmitted to the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, pursuant to such appeal. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said Court 
at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 29th day of August, 
A. D. 1940. 
William J. Korth, 
Clerk Third District Court, 
By Alvin Keddington, 
Deputy Clerk. 
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(Title of Court and Cause.) 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
Comes now the defendant and appellant above 
named and assigns the following errors occurring in 
the trial of this cause before the Honorable M. J. 
Bronson, one of the Judges of the District Court of 
the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and which errors he relies 
upon for a reversal of the judgment in this cause: 
I. 
The court erred in denying defendant's motion 
to quash the information (Tr. 23, Abst. 3). 
II. 
The court erred in denying defendant's demand 
for a further bill of particulars (Tr. 29, Abst. 9). 
III. 
The court erred in denying defendant's motion 
to require plaintiff to elect upon which ground of 
manslaughter the plaintiff would rely (Tr. 32, Abst. 
10). 
IV. 
The court erred in denying defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict of not guilty (Tr. 207, Abst. 
54). 
v. 
The court erred in overruling defendant's mo-
tion for a new trial (Tr. 51, Abst. 77). 
VI. 
The court erred in denying defendant's motion 
in arrest of judgment (Tr. 52, Abst. 78). 
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VII. 
The court erred in overruling defendant's ob-
jection to the following question: 
•'Q. How fast did you tell him the Olds-
mobile was travelling?" (Tr. 106, Abst. 20.) 
VIII. 
The court erred in admitting Exhibit "G" in 
evidence without limiting the purpose of its admis-
sion. (Tr. 126, Abst. 26.) 
IX. 
The court erred in overruling defendant's ob-
jection to the following question: 
"Q. Mr. Taylor, taking into consideration 
your investigation and observations made at the 
intersection of 21st South and 3rd East, taking 
into consideration sketch, Exhibit 'C', which I 
have called to your attention and which you say 
you have discussed with Officer Pierce, taking 
into consideration your observation of the auto-
mobiles which you have stated, I think, you ob-
served the Ford V -8 and the automobile which 
were involved in the accident and the evidence 
in addition to the items which I have mentioned 
that the Oldsmobile car turned over twice as it 
went from point Circle X to the point which 
indicates the place where it came to a stop in-
dicated on the blackboard as X-4, taking into 
consideration the movement of the cars as re-
flected on sketch, Exhibit 'C', and particularly 
the fact that the Ford car after the impact 
turned around and was pointed in a north-
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easterly direction and that the Oldsmobile came 
to rest with the two rear wheels over the curb 
and pointed in a southerly direction practically 
west and that the evidence that the Oldsmobile 
car came to rest at a point 78 feet northwest 
and practically north from a direct line from 
the point of impact, the damage to the auto-
mobiles, the tread of the tires on both cars, the 
type of surface on both roads and particularly 
at the intersection, the elevation transversed, if 
there were any elevation, the inflation of the 
tires, composition of the road, point of impact 
of the two cars and any other evidence reflected 
on Exhibit 'C', have you an opinion as to the 
rate of speed that the car was travelling when 
the brakes were applied at X-5? (Tr. 169-171, 
Abst. 38-39.) 
X. 
The court erred in overruling defendant's ob-
jection to the following question: 
"Q. Now will you give us your opinion as 
to the speed the car was traveling when the 
brakes were applied on Third East? (Tr. 176-
178, Abst. 41-43.) 
XI. 
The court erred in overruling defendant's ob-
jection to the following question: 
"Q. What is the weight?" (Tr. 174, Abst. 
41.) 
XII. 
The court erred in giving Instruction No. 4 
(Tr. 229, Abst. 69). 
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XIII. 
The court erred in giving Instruction No.5 (Tr. 
229, Abst. 60). 
XIV. 
The court erred in giving Paragraph No. 1 of 
Instruction No. 5 (Tr. 229, Abst. 60). 
XV. 
The court erred in giving Paragraph No. 2 of 
Instruction No. 5 (Tr. 229, Abst. 60). 
XVI. 
The court erred in giving Paragraph No. 3 of 
Instruction No. 5 (Tr. 229, Abst. 61). 
XVII. 
The court erred in giving Paragraph No. 4 of 
Instruction No. 5 (Tr. 229, Abst. 61). 
XVIII. 
The court erred in giving the following portion 
of Instruction No. 5 : 
You are further instructed that anyone 
violating any of the provisions of law as set 
forth above is guilty of the commission of an 
unlawful act not amounting to a felony. (Tr. 
229, Abst. 61.) 
XIX. 
The court erred in giving Instruction No.6 (Tr. 
229, Abst. 62). 
XX. 
The court erred in giving Paragraph No. 1 of 
Instruction No. 6 (Tr. 229, Abst. 62). 
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XXI. 
The court erred in giving the following portion 
of Instruction No. 6 : 
And in so doing violated one or more of 
the provisions of the statutes of the State of 
Utah set forth in Instruction No. 5. (Tr. 229, 
Abst. 62.) 
XXII. 
The court erred in giving the second paragraph 
of Instruction No. 6. (Tr. 229, Abst. 62.) 
XXIII. 
The court erred in giving the following portion 
of the second paragraph of Instruction No. 6 : 
That in violating one or more of the provi-
sions of the statute set forth in Instruction No. 
5. (Tr. 229, Abst. 62.) 
XXIV. 
The court erred in giving the third paragraph 
of Instruction No. 6. (Tr. 229, Abst. 62.) 
XXV. 
The court erred in giving the fifth paragraph of 
of Instruction No. 6. (Tr. 229, Abst. 62.) 
XXVI. 
The court erred in giving the following portion 
of the fifth paragraph of Instruction No. 6: 
By the violation of one or more of the pro-
visions of the statute as set forth in Instruction 
5. .(Tr. 230, Abst. 62-63.) 
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XXVII. 
The court erred in giving Instruction No. 6-a. 
(Tr. 230, Abst. 63.) 
XXVIII. 
The court erred in giving the following portion 
of Instruction No. 6-A: 
You are instructed that if you believe from 
the evidence that the defendant, Jess Andersen, 
was guilty of an unlawful act or acts, not 
amounting to a felony, in the manner in which 
he operated his automobile at the time and place 
in question. (Tr. 230, Abst. 63.) 
XXIX. 
The court erred in giving Instruction No. 8. 
(Tr. 230, Abst. 64.) 
XXX. 
The court erred in giving the following portion 
of Instruction No. 9 : 
Engaged in an unlawful act or acts. (Tr. 
230, Abst. 65.) 
XXI. 
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
Requested Instruction No. 1. (Tr. 35, Abst. 72.) 
XXXII. 
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
Requested Instruction No. 2 (Tr. 36, Abst. 73). 
XXXIII. 
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
Requested Instruction No. 5. (Tr. 39, Abst. 73.) 
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XXXIV. 
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
Requested Instruction No. 7. (Tr. 41, Abst. 74.) 
XXXV. 
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
Requested Instruction No. 8. (Tr. 42, Abst. 74.) 
XXXVI. 
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
Requested Instruction No. 9. (Tr. 43, Abst. 75.) 
XXXVII. 
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
Requested Instruction No. 10. (Tr. 44, Abst. 75.) 
XXXVIII. 
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
Requested Instruction No. 12. (Tr. 46, Abst. 75.) 
XXXIX. 
That the verdict is contrary to the law and evi-
dence in the following particulars: 
(A) That the evidence does not show that the 
person injured and who thereafter died by reason of 
the accident was one Clark Romney. 
(B) That the evidence does not show that the 
defendant drove his automobile in a reckless or 
marked disregard for the safety of others but shows 
that he was driving an automobile at a lawful rate of 
speed on Third East and that as soon as he appre-
hended the stop sign, did everything in his power to 
avoid the accident and to protect the rights of others. 
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WHEREFORE, this appellant and defendant 
prays that the foregoing may be considered by this 
Court as his assignments of error and that the ver-
dict and judgment appealed from be reversed. 
Dated this 27th day of September, 1940. 
EDWARD F. RICHARDS, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
(Duly served and filed.) 
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